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Abstract 
 
 
 This research explores forecasting techniques to estimate the Cost per Flying 
Hour for Army Helicopters.  Specifically, three separate forecasting techniques are 
evaluated to better predict the CPFH for better estimating and budgeting by the US 
Army.  To begin, the three cost categories are empirically analyzed for each helicopter.  
For forecasting purposes, actual CPFH figures were compiled from 1995 to 2003 for all 
MACOMs flying the AH-64A, the CH-47D, and the UH-60A helicopters.  The number 
of MACOMs is then reduced to the top three in regards to total CPFH expenditure.  The 
use of a 3-year moving average, the single exponential smoothing method and the Holt’s 
linear method are explored for each helicopter's data.  These forecasting techniques are 
used to forecast for FY03 in evaluating the best methodology to forecast the CPFH for 
FY04.  By comparing both the budgeted and forecasted figures for FY00 – FY02 to the 
actual CPFH figures in the same years, an accurate CPFH forecast for all of the 
MACOMs was possible.  When data became available, a comparison of the actual, 
budgeted, and forecasted CPFH for FY03 was performed.  The Holt’s linear method was 
discovered to be the best forecasting method for 78 percent of the time series analyzed 
since they contained positive trends.  Finally, the best forecast to be provided for FY04 is 
calculated with the chosen forecasting method. 
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ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING OF ARMY OPERATING AND SUPPORT 
COST FOR ROTARY AIRCRAFT 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Background 
 The cost of operations and support (O&S) activities has become increasingly 
important in recent years due to shrinking budgets, aging aircraft, and the cost of 
maintaining newer, more technologically advanced weapon systems.  O&S costs include 
“All personnel, equipment, supplies, software, services, including contract support, 
associated with operating, modifying, maintaining, supplying, training, and supporting a 
defense acquisition program in the DoD inventory” (1:49).  O&S costs are one of the four 
main cost categories that constitute the life cycle cost of a weapon system.  The other 
three cost categories are Research and Development (R&D), Investment, and Disposal.  
O&S costs constitute the majority of the total life cycle cost for aircraft.  See Figure 1 
below.  
    Figure 1.  Nominal Cost Distribution 
(TYPICAL 1980 DOD ACQUISITION PROGRAM WITH A SERVICE LIFE OF ABOUT 30 YEARS) 
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 Controlling life cycle costs for weapon systems is a major issue for the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  The military must do more with less.  O&S costs are 
rising and have become a very large portion of the Army’s budget.  Increases to O&S 
costs limit budget requests for new weapons systems development, modernization, and 
infrastructure.  O&S costs consist primarily of operations and maintenance (O&M) and 
military personnel (MILPERS) appropriations.  In an August 2001 report, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported that approximately 37 percent of the DoD’s 
budget goes to support the O&M costs for military weapon systems (2:1).  The costs will 
continue to rise as weapon systems become older and more antiquated. 
 Managers and cost analysts must pay increased attention to the trends in cost 
management.  A view involving the total life-cycle cost must be adopted; an incomplete 
perspective that only includes the costs of development and production is no longer 
acceptable.  More accurate estimating will lead to better budgeting, reduction in total 
ownership costs, and improved fiscal responsibility.  As today’s aircraft age, the cost of 
maintaining the equipment will increase to unprecedented levels.  This research will 
examine O&S costs for Army rotary aircraft in an effort to develop forecasts for future 
cost per flying hour (CPFH).  The research conducted and model developed will prove 
valuable in the overall aim to reduce the Army’s total ownership costs of current and 
future rotary aircraft weapon systems. 
 
Problem 
 A discrepancy has arisen in the past several years between submissions the 
services have provided in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) during the out-
 3
years and the actual expenditures reported for CPFH programs. The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense/Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD/CAIG) requests the 
development of a measurement tool to analyze the validity of the services’ submissions 
effectively.  Forecasting models for CPFH are necessary for all aircraft within each 
service.  The aim of this research will be to develop a model that accurately forecasts 
future CPFH for Army rotary aircraft.  The ultimate goal will be to give the OSD/CAIG a 
useful tool with which to compare the services projections against independent analyses 
in expectations of forecasting and possibly controlling future O&S costs. 
 
Research Questions/Objectives 
 The following research questions and objectives are addressed in the body of the 
thesis: 
1. Primary:   
• To provide OSD/CAIG with a useful tool to forecast CPFH for Army 
rotary aircraft. 
2. Secondary: 
• For the weapons systems being studied, what are the forecasted CPFH for 
fiscal year 2004? 
• How do the forecasted figures of FY00-FY02 compare to the budget 
submissions in the same years? 
• To what extent did the budget submissions deviate from actual CPFH 
figures in FY00-FY02?  
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• What are the major O&S cost drivers, by MACOM, for each weapon 
system? 
 
Summary of Current Knowledge 
 The services believe that the increase in total O&M costs is mainly attributable to 
the escalating costs for aging equipment (2:1).  O&S costs consist of O&M plus the cost 
of military personnel.  Therefore, escalating O&M costs would directly increase O&S 
funding levels.  The aforementioned study conducted by the Congressional Budget Office 
indicates that increased O&M spending is not a direct result of aging equipment.  O&M 
spending includes diverse cost categories such as costs for health care, environmental 
programs, real property maintenance, and base operating support.  Although the report 
does not support the contention that the increase in O&M costs is due to aging 
equipment, evidence exists that aircraft become more costly to maintain as the aircraft 
age.  For example, Navy aircraft spending could escalate by $40 million to $130 million 
per year in a yearly O&M budget of $23 billion (2:2).  Because O&M costs constitute a 
large portion of O&S costs, O&S CPFH will more than likely accelerate in the future.   
 The CBO study suggests average aircraft age has increased slightly over the past 
two decades.  Cumulative O&M spending per hour has increased but not significantly so.  
The study differs from the services’ perspective in that the services suggest that O&M 
costs for aging equipment are spiraling out of control.  According to the CBO, only 20 
percent of O&M spending is directly dependent on equipment.  The report states, “CBO’s 
findings are in conflict with the services’ statements that spending on O&M for 
equipment is growing rapidly.  Those statements are sometimes based on selective data” 
 5
(2:9).  The study indicates that aircraft, including rotary, are the only weapon systems 
that have increased in average age; however, none of the weapon systems have 
experienced notable O&M cost growth over the past couple of decades (2:8). 
 The CBO report surmises that costs for operating equipment may indeed increase 
as the weapon systems age but that cost may be paid for with other appropriations not 
including O&M funding.  The sources that fund O&S costs include the following: 
operation and maintenance, military personnel, procurement, military construction, stock 
funds, and other appropriations (1:49).  The rising costs could be attributed to higher 
personnel costs due to increased maintenance for modifications to equipment paid for 
with procurement funds (2:20).  Thus, even though the CBO does not agree that weapon 
systems O&M costs are rising mainly due to aging equipment, the services’ contention 
that O&S costs are rapidly increasing for aging equipment remains valid because O&S 
costs are funded by other appropriations besides O&M money. 
 More research needs to be conducted for cross-service studies to address cost 
growth and the relationship between cost growth and age.  This thesis will address the 
O&S CPFH for rotary aircraft within the Army.  Trends over time will provide answers 
to whether or not CPFH has increased substantially by aircraft type and as a whole.  
Trends will be forecasted to provide the OSD/CAIG with a yardstick to measure against 
Army rotary aircraft CPFH budget submissions for the POM out-years. 
 
Scope and Limitations 
 This research will develop a forecasting model useful in predicting trends in 
CPFH for Army rotary aircraft.  At the same time this research is being conducted, 
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similar research efforts will be conducted for the Air Force and Navy.  Lt Laubacher 
examines the O&S CPFH for Air Force rotary aircraft.  Lt Wilkes investigates O&S 
CPFH for Navy rotary aircraft. 
The results from all three theses will provide the OSD/CAIG with an effective 
tool to measure against the services’ POM submissions and the results will give the 
CAIG a better understanding of the services’ rotary aircraft CPFH.   
  
Standards 
 In developing an accurate projection of future events, models must be constructed 
that utilize certain relationships inherent within a system.  In the case of forecasting, 
historical data can be analyzed and relationships between time series data can be used to 
develop models that suggest increasing or decreasing trends.  Certain standards will be 
utilized to obtain the best forecasting or predictive model.  Chapter three will address 
these standards such as mean error, variances, and other useful statistical performance 
measures. 
 
Approach/Methodology 
 Each service tracks O&S costs for rotary aircraft.  The Navy was the first service 
to implement a database responsible for presenting all O&S cost information for weapon 
systems.  The Navy database is called the Visibility and Management of Operating and 
Support Costs (VAMOSC).  The Army and Air Force created similar systems of their 
own for reporting O&S cost information.  The Army’s version of the VAMOSC is the 
Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS).  The Air Force 
named their system the Air Force Total Ownership Costs (AFTOC) database.  The 
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OSMIS system will be used extensively to extract O&S cost information for Army rotary 
aircraft.  
 The OSMIS database will be used to sort O&S cost information by rotary aircraft 
model and MACOM for each year.  The first step is to analyze the data to determine how 
the costs are broken out according to the cost element structure (CES) of O&S costs 
described in the O&S Cost Estimating Guide.  The results will indicate any trends in 
recent years.  Additionally, the data will identify any components that may significantly 
increase as a percentage of the overall cost.  Any change in the CES cost composition 
will be addressed to decide if the change is model specific or if the trend subsists in all 
models of rotary aircraft.    
 The next step involves collecting the cost per flying hour (CPFH) for each of the 
rotary aircraft types for each year.  The OSMIS database contains all rotary aircraft 
information during the years 1995-2002.  This data will then be compared to the 
budgeted submissions in the same year to show any variances that exists between the 
actual CPFH and the budgeted CPFH. 
 Next, the actual CPFH data from the previous step will be employed in 
developing a predictive model for forecasting CPFH for rotary aircraft.  The model will 
capture any trends within the cost data.  The model will help defend the CAIG’s position 
if a future disconnect arises between the services’ submissions and OSD/CAIG’s in-
house estimates. 
 After developing a robust model useful for providing future CPFH forecasts, the 
forecasted CPFH will be compared to the actual CPFH to show any variances present.  
These variances will be compared to the budget variances.  The CAIG can compare its 
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estimates to the model to decide if any revisions are needed in the current CAIG 
forecasting process.  The final step of the research will be using the model developed for 
each MACOM to forecast the CPFH for FY04. 
 
Organization 
 This thesis is divided into five chapters.  Chapter one provides background 
information on the importance of accurate O&S cost estimation.  A brief description of 
the problem and research questions/objectives is given.  Then the scope, limitations, and 
methodology portions are introduced.  Chapter two presents more detailed background 
information on O&S costs and CPFH.  Past research is analyzed to provide the reader 
with a historic look at the research that has been previously completed.  Chapter three 
describes the methods used to answer the research questions presented.  The findings and 
results of this research are given in chapter four.  Chapter five provides a summary and 
conclusion based upon the analyses performed; and finally, recommendations for future 
research are offered. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
This literature review provides a background into estimating Operating and 
Support (O&S) costs and the Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) program.  It explains the 
regulations that dictate O&S costs estimating, describes the CPFH program, lists the 
current Army inventory of the helicopters being studied for this research, and finally, 
covers past research in this area.  This literature review explains what is required by law 
and by the regulations governing O&S costs and the CPFH program, and also explains 
the origin and requirements of the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support 
Costs (VAMOSC) database used in this research to forecast future years CPFH for the 
specific weapons systems being studied. 
 
Introduction 
 The life-cycle cost for a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) 
encompasses the combined costs for a weapon system from the Mission Need Statement 
(MNS) through disposal and deactivation. In recent years, decision makers within DoD 
have increasingly emphasized projecting realistic O&S costs.  This initiative to estimate 
costs realistically results from escalating outflows for aging systems and the need for 
newer, more technologically sound weapons in an unprecedented era of rapid deployment 
and global terrorism.  The ability to plan for precise life-cycle costs has become more 
crucial because of increased scrutiny involving oversight of funds and competition for 
scarce resources.  O&S costs represent the largest portion of the total life-cycle cost.  
Figure 2 illustrates a typical break-out of the life-cycle costs for a typical weapon system. 
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Figure 2.  Program Life Cycle (Illustrative) 1 
 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) will spend billions of dollars on force 
modernization in the post September 11 timeframe.  Although the Bush administration 
has increased the defense budget, the military still faces an uphill battle to produce 
cutting edge technology.  Military men and women must remain vigilant in all areas of 
defense budgeting.  The cost analyst can make significant contributions by accurately 
forecasting O&S costs.  The overall defense budget has shrunk since the Cold War and 
consequently, the military must do more with less.  Table 1 shows the DoD Budget 
Authority by Appropriation figures for the total budget and the O&M portion of the 
budget. 
                                                 
1 Figure 2 is taken from the OSD CAIG Operating And Support Cost-Estimating Guide (Ref 8).  The figure 
is used for illustrative purposes only.  Actual program results may vary. 
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Table 1.  DoD Budget Authority by Appropriation Table2 
Fiscal Year Current $ Constant FY03 O&M Current $ O&M Constant % of O&M Growth O&M %
(Billions) $ (Billions) (Billions) $ (Billions) (FY03 Constant $) of DoD Budget
1985 286.802 461.666 77.803 126.827 - 27.47%
1990 292.999 405.421 88.309 123.188 - 30.39%
1998 258.583 294.567 97.215 110.484 2.5 37.51%
1999 278.595 309.988 104.992 116.663 5.6 37.63%
2000 290.534 315.183 108.776 118.479 1.6 37.59%
2001 309.948 326.385 115.758 121.259 2.3 37.15%
2002 329.878 337.195 127.668 130.241 7.4 38.62%
2003 378.624 378.624 150.444 150.444 15.5 39.73%  
 In 1985, the DoD budget totaled approximately $462 billion (FY03 constant 
dollars).  The 1985 total exceeds FY03 by almost $84 billion.  The overall budget has 
decreased in terms of FY03 constant dollars from 1985 to 2003, but the amount of O&M 
funding has increased during this period.  O&S costs consist mainly of O&M and 
military personnel (MILPERS) appropriations.  The percentage of O&M funding out of 
the total budget increased from 27.5 percent in 1985 to nearly 40 percent in 2003.  The 
percent of real cost growth in O&M funding increased 15.5 percent from 2002 to 2003.  
Thus, O&M has become a substantial part of the defense budget.  Therefore, accurate 
predictions for O&M cost estimates, including O&M estimates for Cost Per Flying Hour 
(CPFH), is imperative.  Figure 3 depicts the budget trends graphically.  The DoD total 
budget exhibits an upward trend but increases at a slower pace during the 1980s.  O&M 
costs show a steady increase in the overall trend. 
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Figure 3.  DoD Annual Budget and O&M Funding 
 
 When looking at the initial cost of procuring a weapon system, the acquisition 
professional must not focus solely on the cost to produce the weapon system, but instead 
must look at the entire spectrum of costs.  The sustainment portion of the life-cycle cost 
constitutes the major apportionment of funding.  This thesis concentrates specifically on 
examining the CPFH distribution of O&S costs for Army rotary aircraft.  Figure 4 depicts 
a list of rotary wing aircraft within the Army arsenal.  Forecasting tools will be applied to 
predict O&S CPFH for Army rotary wing aircraft.  The projections will serve the cost 
estimating community at the OSD/CAIG level with more defined CPFH data.  The 
OSD/CAIG analysts will then possess the tools to identify any discrepancies with future 
estimates provided in the program objective memorandum (POM) estimates submitted by 
the services. 
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Aircraft, Rotary Wing 
• Apache Longbow – AH64A 
• Blackhawk – UH60A 
• Chinook – CH47D 
 
Figure 4. Listing of United States Army Rotary Wing Aircraft2 
 
 
Figure 5.  Apache Longbow- AH64A (4) 
 
The Apache is a heavy division/corps attack helicopter (4).  With it, the Army 
conducts rear, close, and shaping missions as well as precision strikes against 
relocatable targets (4).  Figure 5 shows the Apache Longbow in flight. 
                                                 
2 List taken from the United States Army fact file: 
http://www.army.mil/fact_files_site/aircraft.html (Ref 4). 
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Figure 6.  Blackhawk-UH60A (4) 
 
The Blackhawk is a utility tactical transport helicopter that provides air assault, 
aeromedical evacuation, and command and control and special operations support (4).  It 
has enhanced the overall mobility of the Army due to improvements in troop capacity and 
cargo lift capability by replacing the UH-1 Huey (4).  Figure 6 shows a Blackhawk in 
flight. 
 
Figure 7.  Chinook-CH47 (4) 
 
The Chinook is a transport helicopter, used to transport ground forces, supplies, 
ammunition, and other critical cargo in support of worldwide combat and contingency 
operations (4).  It has been in service since 1962 and has been through numerous 
upgrades (4).  Figure 7 shows a Chinook being utilized to transport troops. 
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History of O&S Initiative 
 The DoD realizes the significant impact of O&S costs on its budget.  The first 
efforts to track and control these costs began with the Visibility and Management of 
Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC II) project in 1975 (5:1).  This initiative was 
prompted by the Management By Objective (MBO) 9, with the stated goal of reducing 
operating and support (O&S) costs within the DoD (5:1).  MBO 9-2, a subset of MBO 9, 
pointed out that historically, DoD components did not include O&S costs as a major 
factor in the acquisition of a new weapon system (5:1).  The costs of maintaining current 
weapon systems should be identified and analyzed in order to estimate costs of new 
systems under consideration.  The purpose of MBO 9-2 to define the total costs 
associated with the acquisition and fielding of a weapon system within the different 
branches of the armed services (5:1).  The objective divided the total Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC) of a system into two main categories: acquisition costs and ownership costs (5:2).  
The ownership costs, known together as O&S costs, were the area for concern and what 
most interested the DoD.  Figure 8 shows a detailed breakdown of what constitutes the 
different stages of total ownership costs for Navy aircraft.  
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Figure 8. Aircraft Total Ownership/Life Cycle Cost Composition (23) 
 
Since the establishment of MBO 9-2, “DoD policy requires the explicit consideration of 
O&S costs from the beginning of the acquisition process throughout the operational life 
of a program” (6:53).  The OSD VAMOSC program was created to fill the need for O&S 
tracking within DoD.  The Air Force responded to the initiative first with the 
development of the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database.  The Army 
followed with the Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS).  
The OSMIS is a central database that gathers information from Army weapon and 
materiel systems in order to track total O&S costs for every weapon system included in 
the Army’s inventory.   
 The Office of the Secretary of Defense/Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
(OSD/CAIG) is responsible for executive oversight of each service’s O&S database 
according to DoD regulation 5000.4-M.  The regulation requires each DoD component to 
s 
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establish and maintain a database consisting of historical O&S data for all weapon 
systems in its inventory (6:53).  “VAMOSC data shall be used as a basis for decisions 
concerning affordability, budget development, support concepts cost tradeoffs, 
modifications, and retention of current systems” (6:53). The OSD/CAIG promotes 
standardization of data collection by DoD components and provides a means for 
exchange of ideas between the different components in order to improve the use of the 
VAMOSC data (6:55).  The CAIG also provides guidance on improving analytical 
methods for using O&S data. 
 
Major O&S Guidance 
This section explains the legal requirements of O&S estimating and reporting, as 
well as the requirements of O&S estimating provided in DoD directives and guidance.  It 
also provides the background of the current DoD and Air Force O&S reporting program.  
This section summarizes these regulations; it is not intended as a substitute.   
 
     Title 10. 
United States Code Title 10 Section 2434 states:  
The Secretary of Defense may not approve the system development and      
demonstration, or the production and deployment, of a major defense acquisition 
program (MDAP) unless an independent estimate of the full life-cycle cost of the 
program and a manpower estimate for the program have been considered by the 
Secretary (7).    
 
The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations governing the content and 
submission of these required estimates (7).  The regulations shall require that the 
independent estimate of the full life-cycle cost of a program include all costs of 
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development, procurement, military construction, and operations and support without 
regard to funding source or management control (7).  The regulation shall also require 
that the manpower estimate include an estimate of the total number of personnel required 
to operate, maintain, and support the program upon full operational deployment; and to 
train personnel to carry out these activities (7). 
 
     DoD 5000.4-M – O&S Costs. 
DoD Instruction 5000.2 and DoD 5000.2-M require that both a program office 
estimate (POE) and a DoD Component cost analysis (CCA) estimate be prepared 
in support of acquisition milestone reviews.  As a part of this requirement, DoD 
5000.2-M specifies that the DoD Component sponsoring an acquisition program 
establish, as a basis for cost-estimating, a description of the salient features of the 
program and of the system being acquired.  This information is present in a Cost 
Analysis Requirements Description (CARD) (6:8).   
 
     The following sections of the CARD impact O&S costs:  
 
• System Reliability  
• System Maintainability  
• Hardware Support Concept  
• Software Support Concept  
• Supply 
• Training  
• System Manpower Requirements  
• Operation Support Facilities 
One of the seven cost terms standardized by DoD 5000.4-M is O&S costs.  
 
O&S costs include all personnel, equipment, supplies, software, services, 
including contract support, associated with operating, modifying, maintaining, 
supplying, training, and supporting a defense acquisition program in the DoD 
inventory.  This includes costs directly and indirectly attributable to the specific 
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defense program; i.e., costs that would not occur if the program did not exist 
(6:48).   
 
     The DoD 5000.4-M lists these O&S categories: 
 
• Mission Personnel 
• Unit Level Consumption 
• Intermediate Maintenance 
• Deport Maintenance 
• Contractor Support 
• Sustaining Support 
• Indirect Support (4:48-49)  
These O&S categories are currently (2003) in review and will be brought up to 
date with the new structure described in the Operating and Support Cost Estimating 
Guide from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group (CAIG) dated July 31, 2003.   
 
     Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide. 
The O&S Cost Estimating Guide provides a cost structure to be established as a 
guide to assist DoD costs analysts develop and present the results of operating and 
support cost analyses (8:1).  The OSD/CAIG O&S cost structure categorizes and defines 
cost elements that cover the full range of O&S cost that should occur in any defense 
system (8:1).  The O&S cost element structure is divided into six major categories: 
• Unit Personnel 
• Unit Operations 
• Maintenance 
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• Sustaining Support 
• Continuing System Improvements 
• Indirect Support (8:2) 
The Unit Personnel element includes the costs of all operator, maintenance, and 
support personnel at operating units (8:2).  Unit Personnel include active and reserve 
military, government civilian, and contractor personnel costs (8:2).  Unit Personnel Costs 
are intended to include direct costs (i.e., costs of individuals assigned at installations that 
own the system and that can be clearly associated with the system performing its intended 
defense mission (8:3)). 
Unit Operations includes the unit-level consumption of operation materials such 
as fuel, POL, electricity, expendable stores, training munitions and other operating 
materials (8:5).  Also included are any unit-funded support activities; training devices or 
simulator operations that uniquely support an operational unit; temporary additional 
duty/temporary duty (TAD/TDY) associated with the unit’s normal concept of 
operations; and other unit funded services (8:5).  Unit-funded service contracts for 
administrative equipment as well as unit-funded equipment and software leases are 
included in this portion of the estimate (8:5). 
Maintenance includes the costs of labor above the organizational level and 
materials at all levels of maintenance in support of the primary system, simulators, 
training devices, and associated support equipment (8:7).  All maintenance costs provided 
through a system support contract will be separately identified within the appropriate cost 
element (8:7). 
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Sustaining support includes support services provided by centrally managed 
support activities not funded by the units that own the operating systems (8:10).  It is 
intended that costs included in this category represent costs that can be directly tied to a 
specific system and exclude costs that must be arbitrarily allocated (8:10). 
Continuing System Improvements includes the costs of hardware and software 
updates that occur after deployment of a system that improve a system’s safety, 
reliability, maintainability, or performance characteristics to enable the system to meet its 
basic operational requirements through out its life (8:12).  These costs include 
government and contract labor, materials, and overhead costs (8:12).  Costs are required 
to be separated into government and contactor costs within each cost element (8:12). 
The Continuing System Improvements portion of an O&S estimate does not 
include all changes to a system developed subsequent to the initial delivered 
configuration (8:12).  System improvements identified as part of a pre-planned product 
improvement program that are included in the acquisition cost estimate are not included 
in this portion of an O&S cost estimate (8:12).  Improvements designed to be 
incorporated in production lots (e.g., design series, block changes) and improvements that 
would qualify as distinct Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) are not typically 
included in this portion of the O&S cost estimate (8:12-13). 
Indirect Support costs are those installation and personnel support costs that 
cannot be directly related to the units and personnel that operate and support the system 
being analyzed (8:13).  The three levels of Indirect Support include Installation Support, 
Personnel Support, and General Training and Education (8:14-15). 
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     DoD 5000.4-M - Establishment of Visibility and Management of Support Costs   
and Operating and Support Management information System. 
 
Chapter 4 of the DoD 5000.4-M lays the foundation for the Visibility And 
Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) Program.  The purpose of the 
VAMOSC program is to achieve visibility of O&S costs; the DoD components are 
required to establish a historical data collection system and maintain a record of O&S 
data that facilitate the development of a well-defined, standard presentation of O&S costs 
by MDAP (8:53).   
The objectives of the VAMOSC system are to provide visibility of O&S costs for 
use in cost analysis of MDAPs and force structure alternatives in support of the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process and satisfy the Congressional 
requirement that DoD track and report O&S costs for major acquisition programs (8:53).  
VAMOSC is also to provide visibility of critical maintenance and support costs at the 
subsystem level in sufficient detail to promote cost-conscious design and configuration 
management of new and fielded defense programs (8:54).  VAMOSC is to provide 
visibility of O&S costs so they may be managed to reduce and control program life-cycle 
costs (8:54).  Finally, VAMOSC is to improve the validity and credibility of O&S cost 
estimates by establishing a widely accepted database, thereby reducing the cost and time 
for collecting these defense program O&S costs for specific application (8:54). 
The OSD/CAIG is charged with executive oversight of VAMOSC (8:55)  In this 
capacity the OSD/CAIG shall promote standardization of O&S cost data collection by the 
DoD Components, provide a forum for the exchange of ideas among the DoD 
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Components, and promote the effective use of VAMOSC data in predicting future costs 
(8:55). 
The Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS) is the 
Army’s database which supports the DoD’s Visibility and Management of Operating and 
Support Costs (VAMOSC) Program (9:171).  OSMIS is managed by the U.S. Army Cost 
and Economic Analysis Center (USACEAC) and is a source of standardized historical 
O&S cost information for over 500 systems deployed in Active, Guard, and Reserve 
tactical units (9:171).   
 
Recent Army Issues with O&S Costs 
 “The high cost of operating and supporting the Army’s weapon systems is 
absorbing an increasing share of its budget and is reducing funds available for buying 
new systems” (10:1).  The DoD and Army budgets have declined significantly in the past 
decade (11:1).  O&S costs comprise an increasing share of resources and consistently 
consumed half of the Army’s budget (11:1).  Since support costs for current weapon 
systems are rising, funds for new weapon systems are unavailable (10:1).  As the current 
systems age, support costs continue to escalate, resulting in even fewer funds for 
modernization (10:3).  This dilemma has been characterized as the “death spiral" by the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (10:3). 
 In April 1998, DoD placed more responsibility on the program managers of 
acquisition programs for the total life cycle cost of new weapon systems under 
development (10:1).  In the past, program managers focused mainly on meeting 
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acquisition cost, schedule, and performance requirements (10:2).  The cost of the system 
after it was fielded was not emphasized or realistically estimated. 
 Under the 1998 initiative, each service was to designate 10 new development 
programs to test O&S reduction efforts (10:1).  In January 1999, DoD focused similar 
efforts on current weapon systems already in the services’ inventory.  By fiscal year 
2000, new weapons under development were expected to have estimated life cycle costs 
lower than the systems they were replacing, from 20 to 50 percent (10:1). Current 
systems in inventory were expected to reduce O&S costs by 20 percent by fiscal year 
2005 (10:1). 
 The Army has been criticized for not focusing efforts on reducing O&S costs.  In 
a report to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, 
Committee on Armed Services, the Army’s efforts as a result of the two DoD initiatives 
were found to be ineffective by the Governmental Accounting Office (GAO).  Although 
the Army had identified possible reductions for current weapon systems, it did not place 
the priority needed for O&S reduction efforts to meet the DoD’s goals (10:2).  For 
developmental programs, the Army did not assign accountability for O&S cost reductions 
and did not establish requirements that each fielded system maintain these costs at or 
below a specified level (10:2).  Also, the Army was criticized for not collecting and 
maintaining data on all elements of O&S costs for its weapon systems (10:2). 
 The Army had tried to respond to the increasing pressure to reduce O&S costs 
before the DoD’s initiatives.  One effort involved contracting out logistic support as a 
method of cost reduction, a concept called Prime Vendor Support (PVS) (11:1).  “Prime 
Vendor Support is an initiative with industry that saves operations and support (O&S) 
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costs by having the prime contractor assume responsibility for total performance of a 
weapon system and its modernization by integrating modernized spare parts (11:1).” PVS 
was a way for the Army to realize cost reductions without committing additional funds by 
taking advantage of commercial best practices (11:1).  The main concern for this new 
concept was that it be effective in peacetime, during contingency operations, and in war 
(11:2).  It also had to provide and guarantee uninterrupted support and be invisible to the 
end user, the warfighter (11:2). 
 In April 1997, the Army received a proposal from Boeing-Lockheed Martin for 
implementing a PVS for the Apache helicopter (11:2).  The proposal would transfer 
responsibility for complete wholesale support for the Apache to a limited liability 
company known as Team Apache Systems (TAS) (11:2).  TAS would eliminate 
government personnel and facilities formerly needed to acquire, manage, store, and 
distribute spare parts for the Apache (11:2).  “The major advantages of such an 
arrangement would be improved system readiness based on increased availability of 
spare parts and a significant reduction of O&S costs that could provide badly needed 
funds for system modernization” (11:2).  The Apache PVS proposal was expected to 
provide performance guarantees that would reduce the average flying-hour cost by 
approximately 20 percent (11:2).   
 Some of the disadvantages associated with PVS include civilian contractors on 
the battle-field and legal issues with the use of funding used for contracting out 
maintenance and repair (11:3).  Despite the Army’s optimism, the overall savings from 
the PVS proposal have been questioned by the GAO (10:7). 
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Background of the Cost Per Flying Hour Program  
 The Cost per Flying Hour program is a subset of the O&S portion of a budget 
submission.  The Air Force program consists of four model-driven factors: (1) 
consumable supplies (both General Support and System Support Divisions); (2) Depot-
level reparables (DLRs); and (3) aviation fuel (AVFUEL) (12:4).  
(1) Consumable supplies include aircraft parts and supplies that are not repaired and are 
discarded after use (12:4-5).   
(2) Depot-level reparables are aircraft parts that are removed by maintenance personnel 
and sent to a depot for repairs (12:5).   
(3) AVFUEL is fuel used during flight (12:5).   
 The cost associated with the Air Force flying hour program is calculated by using 
a metric known as Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) (12:4).  “Flying hours are the basic 
element for measuring aircraft usage to train aircrews for wartime taskings” (12:4).   
Each year in the November/December timeframe, the major commands (MAJCOMs) 
must submit recommended CPFH rates for each weapon system that will be included in 
the Cost per Flying Hour Program (12:6).  A separate factor for consumables, DLRs, and 
AVFUEL will be included in the submission (12:6).   
 The CPFH development begins by creating a baseline rate using the most recent 
year-end totals for obligations and flying hours (12:6).  “Year-end obligations corrected 
for one-time obligations divided by hours flown develop the baseline CPFH” (12:6).   
The next step involves adjusting the four approved factors due to economic conditions, 
such as inflation/deflation (12:6).  Major commands also review the factors and adjust 
them to account for anything that will affect the cost per flying hour, such as forecasted 
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changes in policy, special programs starting, or changes in the level of maintenance 
(13:8-9). 
 At the same time, the Air Force Working Capital Fund (AFWCF) updates the 
budget and rates for all the AFWCF products, which includes DLRs and consumables, a 
major part of the CPFH expense (12:7).  The four CPFH factors are adjusted according to 
price changes forecast by managers of the AFWCF (13:10).   
 Finally, the factors are used to fund flying hour programs in Air Force’s Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM), the Budget Estimate Submission (BES), and the 
President’s Budget (PB), as well as the Financial Plan’s initial distribution to the 
MAJCOMs (12:7). 
 “The Air Force Working Capital Fund was created in 1996 by the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) as a reorganization of the Defense Business 
Operations Fund” (13:10).  The AFWCF is a revolving fund that sells items necessary to 
support troops, weapon systems, aircraft, communications systems, and other military 
equipment (13:10).  DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14R requires that the 
prices established by the AFWCF at the beginning remain stable for the remainder of the 
fiscal year (13:10).  This stability allows analysts to use the cost factors previously 
calculated to budget more accurately for the flying hour program.  For fiscal years 1996 
and 1997, the AFWCF was unable to establish accurate price lists for the repairable parts 
and consumable items that it supplied to Air Force flying units.  After budgets were 
submitted and approved, prices for repairable parts and consumables were raised to the 
point that the MAJCOMs feared they would not have enough money to complete their 
flying hour programs (13:12).  This price increase forced the Air Force to request 
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supplemental funding to correct the projected shortfall (13:12).  The AFWCF price 
instability has been known for some time and efforts to correct it are currently in progress 
(13:14). 
 The Army follows a similar method for computing factors used in the CPFH 
budget estimates.  Cost factors are calculated by major command and by system based on 
historical data from the last three fiscal years.  Demand for parts and flying hours for the 
system are averaged over the three-year period to obtain an average demand and flying 
hour for the system.  The average demand for parts is multiplied by the updated parts 
price in effect for the upcoming fiscal year and this product is divided by the average 
hours flown over the three-year period (14:10). 
 
Past Research 
     Trends in Weapon System Operating and Support Costs. 
This 1997 study focuses on the weapons systems and mission areas that are 
responsible for force structure-related O&S cost increases.  Two portions of this study 
that are of particular interest to this research are the Department and Mission Category 
Analyses, and the Weapons System Case Studies.  The Department and Mission Category 
Analyses compares O&S costs for FY 1975, 1985, and 1995 for the DoD as a whole, the 
services, and for selected major mission categories, and analyze the results with respect 
to changes in equipment levels, activity rates, capability, age, and asset value (15:I-3).  
The Weapons System Case Studies compare O&S costs for the same years at system-
class level in selected mission categories as case studies (15:I-3).  The Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP) database was used as the primary source of O&S cost data for 
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the Department and Mission Category Analyses; and for the Weapons System Case 
Studies the O&S cost data was drawn from each services VAMOSC database (15:I-4,7). 
 This study first looks at the O&S growth for the department and services during 
the FY 1975 to FY 1995 period.  When the data is normalized to FY 1975, the O&S cost 
of the DoD grew four percent, Navy grew two percent, Army declined six percent, and 
the Air Force declined thirteen percent (15:I-8).  These figures are a combination of 
substantial reductions in military personnel costs and substantial increases in O&M costs 
(15: I-8).  For the same period, DoD O&M costs grew by 36 percent, the Army by 31 
percent, the Navy by 23 percent, and the Air Force by 11 percent (15:I-8).   
After a brief methodology explaining the charts to be used, the study focuses its 
attention on the different services starting with the Department of the Army.  The review 
of this study will focus on the Department of the Army since the analysis of the Army 
included helicopters and the areas covering the Navy and the Air Force excluded 
helicopters from the analysis of O&S costs. 
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Table 2.  Attack Helicopter Data (Cost Data in Constant FY96 Dollars) 
FY75 FY85 FY95
766 1,140 1,393
205 326 527
133,046 201,898 236,370
2,920 4,599 11,248
1,538 2,655 6,754
5 11.5 13.5
174 177 170
268 286 378
1,544 1,613 2,228
703 708 468
134 123 78
AH-1E 97 23
AH-1F 352 501 490
AH-1G 31 11 3
AH-1P 2 95 10
AH-1S 381 389 121
AH-64A 47 746
Average Age
Flying Hours Per Aircraft
O&M Per Aircraft ($K)
Data Element
Aircraft
O&M ($M)
TASCFORM
Equipment Data
Hours
Asset Value ($M)
O&M Per Flight Hour ($)
O&M Per $10K Asset Value ($)
O&M Per Capabiity Unit ($K)
 
 
The Army experienced a six percent decrease in O&S costs between FY 1975 and 
FY 1995; at the same time, O&M costs rose by twenty four percent (15:II-1).  In the 
Mission Category review of the Army the study included Attack Helicopters, Observation 
Helicopters, and Utility Helicopters. 
 
          Attack Helicopters.  
 For Attack Helicopters, Table 2 and Figure 9 show that between FY 1975 and FY 
1995: 
• The total number of aircraft increased 82 percent while flying hours increased by 
78 percent, 
• There was a 157 percent increase in total O&M,  
• Asset value increased by 285 percent and mission capability increased by 339 
percent (15:II-8). 
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Figure 9.  Attack Helicopters 
The per unit section of Table 2 and Figure 10 show that between FY 1975 and FY 1995 
O&M cost: 
• Per aircraft increased by 41 percent, 
• Per flying hour increased by 44 percent, 
• Per $100K of Asset Value dropped by 33 percent, and 
• Per unit of capability dropped by 41 percent (15:II-8). 
Figure 10.  Attack Helicopter O&S Cost Ratio Changes 
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During the FY 1975 to FY 1995 period there was a marked increased modernization 
of attack helicopters (15: II-10).  Table 3 focuses on attack helicopter inventories for the 
time period of this study.  The Army phased out over 300 older AH-1s during the period 
and introduced over 700 new AH-64s (15: II-10).  This modernization has had a 
substantial effect on operating costs. Table 3 also shows the annual operating cost figures 
for attack helicopters and indicates that the AH-64s are nearly twice as expensive as the 
AH-1s (15:II-10).  
Table 3.  Attack Helicopter Modernization & Annual O&M Costs (FY96 $) 
Aircraft Type FY75 FY95 Change
AH-1S 381.00 121.00 -260.00
AH-1G 31.00 3.00 -28.00
AH-1E 23 23.00
AH-1P 2.00 10.00 8.00
AH-1F 352.00 490.00 138.00
AH-64A 746 746.00  
O&M ($M)
0.31
0.57
Aircraft Type
AH-1S
AH-64  
 
The Army’s experience in this mission area is typical of one in which substantial 
modernization has taken place during the 20-year period: 
• O&M cost per flight hour is up, 
• O&M cost per unit of asset value is down, 
• O&M cost per unit of capability is down, and 
• O&M cost per aircraft has been managed down somewhat by reducing flying 
  hours (15: II-11). 
The flying hour reduction per aircraft is small: 
• In FY 1975, 133,046 flying hours were allocated among 766 aircraft to produce 
an average of 174 flying hours per aircraft per year (15: II-11). 
• In FY 1995, 236,370 flying hours were allocated among 1393 aircraft to produce 
an average of 170 flying hours per aircraft, a decrease of approximately 2 percent 
(15:II-11). 
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Altogether, changes in the number and mix of aircraft between FY 1975 and FY 
1995 and the differences in their operating costs substantially account for the $322 
million increase in O&M cost in Table 3 (15:II-11). 
          Observation Helicopters. 
For Observation Helicopters Table 4 and Figure 11 show that between FY 1975 and 
FY 1995: 
• The total number of aircraft decreased 35 percent,  
• There is a 30-percent decrease in total O&M, and  
• Asset value decreased by 27 percent (15: II-11). 
 
Table 4.  Observation Helicopter Data (Cost Data in Constant FY96 $) 
FY75 FY85 FY95
2,470 2,324 1,606
120 113 83
481,650 453,180 313,170
313 297 228
4 14 19.3
195 195 195
49 49 51
250 250 264
3,842 3,816 3,629
OH-58A 1,479 1,368 782
OH-58C 594 582 443
OH-58D 5 7 327
OH-6A 392 367 54
Not Available
O&M Per Aircraft ($K)
TASCFORM
Average Age
Flying Hours Per Aircraft
Asset Value ($M)
Equipment Data
Data Element
Aircraft
O&M ($M)
Hours
O&M Per Flight Hour ($)
O&M Per $10K Asset Value ($)
 
 
The per unit section of Table 4 and Figure 12 show that between FY 1975 and FY 1995, 
the O&M cost: 
• Per aircraft increased by 4 percent, 
• Per flying hour increased by 6 percent, and  
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• Per $100K of Asset Value dropped by 6 percent (15: II-12) 
Figure 11.  Observation Helicopters Total Resource and Performance Changes 
Figure 12.  Observation Helicopter O&S Cost Ratio Changes 
 The Army bought new models of observation helicopters and reduced the size of 
its fleet during this period (15: II-13).  Table 5 focused on observation helicopter 
inventories for the time period of this study.  The Army phased out 338 older OH-6A and 
848 OH-58A-C models during the period and introduced 322 new OH-58Ds. (15: II-13). 
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This modernization has increased operating costs for observation helicopters. Table 5 
also shows the annual operation cost figures for observation helicopters and indicates that 
the OH-58s are nearly twice as expensive as the OH-6s. 
Table 5.  Observation Helicopter Modernization & Annual O&M Costs (FY96 $) 
Aircraft Type FY75 FY95 Change
OH-6A 392.00 54.00 -338.00
OH-58A 1479.00 782.00 -697.00
OH-58C 594 443 -151.00
OH-58D 5.00 327.00 322.00  
O&M ($K)
34.0
67.0
Aircraft Type
OH-6
AH-64  
 
The Army’s experience in this mission area is one in which some modernization has 
taken place during the 20 year period (15: II-14).  Also, a significant drawdown in  
the number of aircraft changed the model mix enough so that: 
• O&M cost per flight hour is up, and  
• O&M cost per unit of asset value is down (15: II-14). 
 
The change in the number and mix of aircraft between FY 1975 and FY 1995 
substantially accounts for the $37 Million decrease in O&M costs shown for observation 
helicopters in Table 5 (15:II-14). 
          Utility Helicopters. 
 For Utility Helicopters, Table 6 and Figure 13 reveal several important changes 
between FY 1975 and FY 1995: 
• The total number of aircraft decreased 25 percent, 
• There is a 56 percent increase in total O & M, and  
• Asset Value increased by 23 percent. (15: II-14). 
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Figure 13.  Utility Helicopters Total Resource and Performance Changes 
Looking at the per unit section of Table 6 and Figure 14, we see that between FY 1975 
and FY 1995 the O & M cost: 
• Per aircraft increased by 107 percent, 
• Per flying hour increased by 207 percent, 
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Table 6.  Utility Helicopter Data (Cost Data in Constant FY96 Dollars) 
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• Per $100k of Asset Value dropped by 166 percent, and 
• Per unit of capability increased by 27 percent (15: II-14). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Utility Helicopter O&S Cost Ratio Changes 
The Army modernized its utility helicopters during this period and reduced the 
size of its fleet (15: II-16).  Table 7 focuses on Utility Helicopter inventories for the time 
period of this study.  Over 2,300 older UH-1 models were phased out during the period 
and over 1,200 new UH-60s were introduced (15: II-16).  Table 7 also shows that this 
modernization has caused mission operating costs to increase, and also indicates that the 
UH-1s are much cheaper to operate than the UH-60s (15: II-16). 
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Table 7.  Utility Helicopter Modernization & Annual O&M Costs (FY96 $) 
Aircraft Type FY75 FY95 Change
UH-1B 430 38 -392
UH-1H 3,322 1,688 -1,634
UH-1M 309 -309
UH-1V 369 367 -2
UH-60A 926 926
UH-60L 316 316  
O&M ($K)
54.0
194.0
305.0
Aircraft Type
UH-1H
UH-60A
UH-60L  
 
The change in the mix of aircraft between FY 1975 and FY 1995 substantially 
accounts for the $186 million increase in O&M costs shown for Utility Helicopters in 
Table 7 (15: II-16).  The Army’s experience in this mission area is typical of one in 
which moderate modernization has taken place during the 20 year period: 
• O&M cost per flight hour is up, and 
• O&M cost per unit of Asset Value is down (15: II-17). 
 
However, in the case of utility helicopters, O&M cost per unit of capability is up (15: II-
17). 
 The study shifts its attention to case studies comparing O&S costs and 
characteristics of similar weapon systems.  Two studies that are of particular interest are 
Attack Helicopters: AH-1s vs. AH-64A and Utility Helicopters: UH-1H vs. UH-60A.  
 
          Attack Helicopters: AH-1s vs. AH-64A.  
Comparative O&S cost and helicopter characteristic data are summarized in Table 
8 for the Cobra (AH-1) and the Apache (AH-64A) attack helicopters (15:II-19). 
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Table 8.  O&S Cost&Characteristics for Attack Helicopters (Cost Data in CY FY96 $) 
AH-1S AH-64A
8,648 10,220
38,532 7,497
11,262 60,494
150,352 326,922
28,253 22,782
14,756 1,769
251,803 429,685
130 130
1937 3305
1 1.71
10,000 14,694
6,598 11,387
133 158
369 300
2.6 1.83
262 370
2 2
3.7 12.81
3.182 10.47
AWG-10 AWG-9
20-mm cannon 30-mm chain gun
8 TOW missiles Hellfire missiles
76 2.75-in. rockets Hydra 70 rockets
Capability (TASCFORM score)
Weapon Control
Armament
Fuel Capacity (gallons)
Crew
Asset Value ($M)
Max TOGW (lbs.)
Empty Weight (lbs.)
Depot Maintenance (End Item)
Intermediate Maintenance
Characteristics
Flight Hours Per Year
Direct O&S Cost Per Flight Hour
Ammunition
Cost Ratio
Repairables (Net)
Consumables
Endurance (hours)
Max Speed (knots)
Operating radius (miles)
Fuel
Cost Element
Annual Direct O&S Cost
 
 
Total O&S costs for the AH-64A are 71 percent higher than comparable costs for 
the AH-1S (15: II-20).  Consumables and component repair (repairables) showed much 
larger than average increases while ammunition, intermediate maintenance, and depot 
end-item maintenance were less (15: II-20). 
 The AH-64A is larger, heavier, and faster than the AH-1S and has a more 
sophisticated armament and fire-control system (15: II-20).  The asset value of the  
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AH-64A is 246 percent higher than for the AH-1, and the TASCFORM score, a measure 
of weapon system capability, is 229 percent higher for the AH-64A (15:II-20).  The  
AH-64’s asset value and capability grew faster than its O&S cost, which results in a 
lower O&S cost per unit of asset value or capability than for the AH-1S. 
 
          Utility Helicopters: UH-1H vs. UH-60A. 
 Comparative O&S cost and helicopter characteristic data are summarized in Table 
9 for the Huey (UH-1H) and Blackhawk (UH-60A) utility helicopters (15: II-20). 
The UH-60A is more than twice the empty weight of the UH-1H, and it has the 
capability to carry twice as much cargo (externally loaded) (15: II-20).  The maximum 
speed is 145 knots compared to 107 for the UH-1H.  The asset value of the UH-60A is 
615 percent higher than for the UH-1H (15: II-20).  The UH-60A is 172 percent higher in 
terms of ton-miles per hour, a measure of capability used for cargo carrying non-combat 
vehicles (15: II-20). 
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Table 9.  O&S Cost&Characteristics for Utility Helicopters (Cost Data in CY FY96 $) 
UH-1H UH-60A
9,104 10,220
259 7,497
4,843 60,494
43,782 326,922
32,599 22,782
8,674 1,769
99,261 429,685
150 130
662 3305
1 2.77
9,500 14,694
5,210 11,387
106.7 158
317 300
209 370
4,000 lbs external 8,000 lbs external
or 10 passengers 11 combat troops
3 3
0.923 6.6
213.4 580
3 x 7.62-mm MGs 2 x 7.62-mm MGs
Empty Weight (lbs.)
Payload
Crew
O&S Cost Per Flight Hour
Cost Ratio
Characteristics
Max TOGW (lbs.)
Cost Element
Fuel
Ammunition
Consumables
Repairables (Net)
Intermediate Maintenance
Depot Maintenance (End Item)
Annual Direct O&S Cost
Flight Hours Per Year
Max Speed (knots)
Combat radius (miles)
Fuel Capacity (gallons)
Asset Value ($M)
Capability (Ton-miles per hour)
Armament  
 
 O&S costs for the UH-60A are 177 percent higher, asset value is 615 percent 
higher, and capability is 172 percent higher than for the UH-1H.  The UH-60’s capability 
grew at about the same rate as its O&S cost, which resulted in a similar O&S cost per 
unit of capability compared to the UH-1H (15:II-21).  The UH-60’s asset value grew 
faster than its O&S cost, which results in a lower O&S cost per unit of asset value   
(15:II-21). 
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 Both the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force sections of 
this study looked at the Air to Ground Mission Categories for each service.  However, 
neither of these sections or mission categories addressed O&S costs of Navy or Air Force 
helicopters.  This further validates the need for research in these areas and lends credit to 
the methodology of this research which looks to compare like weapon systems across 
services. 
 
     Parametric Cost Modeling for Navy Aircraft. 
 Parametric models have been developed for numerous weapon systems to provide 
cost analysts with tools useful for predicting costs for analogous systems.  In his thesis 
entitled, A Parametric Cost Model for Estimating Operating and Support Costs of U.S. 
Navy Aircraft, Mustafa Donmez develops multiple parametric models to determine yearly 
O&S costs for new naval aircraft acquisition programs.  Physical parameters such as 
thrust and weight are used to establish any relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables.  The VAMOSC system is used to extract all historical aircraft 
information.  Cost information is analyzed from 1987 through 1998 and is reported in 
constant FY00 dollars. 
 Donmez focused on two main objectives throughout his research.  The goals were 
to find the best fitting O&S model and to create a robust aircraft O&S cost estimating 
methodology for Navy cost analysts when limited information is available to complete 
the estimate (16:5).  Three different parametric cost models were built in the analysis.  
Donmez used multivariate linear regression, a tree-based model, and single variable 
regression to construct the models (16:10).  The weighted ordinary least squares method  
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was used on the first two models because VAMOSC does not break out costs for 
individual aircraft and each command possesses different numbers of aircraft.    
 The cost data supplied by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) is broken 
out by different classes of aircraft.  The four categories are as follows: Fighter/Attack 
(FA), Cargo/Utility (C/U), Rotary-Wings (HELO), and Other (OTH) (16:14).  Multiple 
Type/Mission/Series (T/M/S) aircraft were removed from the analysis due to small 
sample size.  Natural Logarithms were use to transform the data for the purpose of 
normalization.  After eliminating specific T/M/S from analysis and transforming the data, 
two assumptions were validated: 
• The weighted average annual cost for any aircraft T/M/S is constant; it does not 
systematically increase or decrease annually (16:18). 
• Annual O&S cost observations are random samples and drawn from a 
hypothetical population of aircraft (16:18). 
 In the multivariate model, the following independent variables were used to 
examine significant effects on O&S costs (16:34): 
• Commands- Atlantic Fleet (LANFLT), Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), NET (Naval 
Education and Training), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Naval Forces 
Europe (NAVEUR), Reserve Commands (RESERVE), and MISC 
(Miscellaneous) 
• Weight- Continuous Variable (in lbs) 
• Length- Continuous Variable (in ft) 
• Wing Span- Continuous Variable (in ft) 
• Height- Continuous Variable (in ft) 
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• Thrust- Continuous Variable (in st lb) 
• Type- Categorical Variable (A/F, C/U, OTH, HELO) 
• Speed- Continuous Variable (in mph) 
• Crew- Categorical Variable (Number of Manpower on Board 
• Engines- Categorical Variable (Number of Engines) 
 The results of the multivariate model show that wingspan and height have an 
effect on O&S cost growth and weight, engine number, and thrust do not affect O&S 
costs when other independent variables are present (16:40).  Stepwise regression was 
used to determine the utility of the model.  The multivariate model exhibits the best 
summary statistics out of the three models but it is the least useful model.  There are too 
many independent variables in the equation to have any practical use for accurate 
prediction. 
 The second model constructed, the tree-based model, provides the best model for 
estimating for O&S costs.  The results prove more reliable than the other regression-type 
models.  Tree models successively split data into homogeneous subsets (16:46).  Tree-
based models can be described as “a recursive procedure resulting in terminal nodes or 
“leaves” containing groups of cases with similar values in their independent variables, 
which reflect response probabilities” (16:46). 
 The tree-based model for this particular research splits the data into two subsets: 
Reserve and Non-Reserve data.  Each T/M/S was further broken into the four aircraft 
categories mentioned previously.  Weight, length, and thrust were used as predictor 
variables because of their alleged relationship with O&S cost.  The original model  
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resulted in a tree with 51 nodes and a standard error of 1.536 (16:48).  The model was 
reduced to a 10-node tree with an increased standard error of only 0.115.  The 10-node 
tree is more easily interpreted than the 51-node tree.    
 The last model analyzed used univariate regression as a predictor of O&S costs.  
Again, the same predictor parameters of weight, length, and thrust were used because of 
the perceived relationship with O&S costs.  All of the predictive measures exhibit poor 
summary statistics when analyzed in a statistical software package.  The parameter 
variables do show some predictive capabilities confirmed by the low F-statistic values 
(16:58-68). 
 The final conclusions of Donmez’s research indicates more research needs to be 
completed to find better predictive models for estimating O&S costs.  The univariate and 
multivariate models show that “O&S costs of future aircraft acquisitions are not well-
modeled by the physical and performance parameters identified in this study” (16:69).  
The performance parameters do affect O&S costs but they are not successful in 
explaining costs.  The regression models analyzed provide rough-order-of-magnitude 
(ROM) estimates for analysts that do not possess the time nor experience to complete a 
comprehensive analysis for future O&S costs for a weapon system.  The tree-based 
model provided the most successful model in terms of overall use coupled with predictive 
capability. 
 
     Parametric Cost Modeling for Air Force Aircraft. 
 While studying at the Naval Post Graduate School, Wu Ming-Cheng completed a 
thesis that explored O&S parametric modeling for all Air Force aircraft from 1990 
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through 1998.  Ming-Cheng developed his research from a prior RAND study that 
developed cost-estimating relationships (CER) for Air Force aircraft from 1981 through 
1986.  Ming-Cheng reported that flyaway costs and flying hours were the major cost 
drivers during that period (17:2).  Additionally, the Ming-Cheng thesis reported modest 
cost growth as the aircraft fleet aged. 
 Ming-Cheng tried to determine if the cost drivers for O&S costs observed during 
the years of the RAND study still applied to Air Force aircraft in recent years past.  The 
ability to retrieve O&S aircraft cost data is easier now that the AFTOC system is fully 
operational.  Ming-Cheng cited three subsystems broken down in the AFTOC system: 
Weapon System Support Cost (WSSC), Component Cost System (CSCS), and Source 
Data Preprocessor (SDP) (17:5-6).  Ming-Cheng’s thesis specifically focused on the 
WSSC subsystem of the AFTOC.   
 Ming-Cheng developed three models using regression analysis to obtain the best 
equation for successfully predicting O&S costs for aircraft models.  Flying hours, 
flyaway costs, number of aircraft, and aircraft fleet ages were the independent variables 
in the analysis (17:37-40).  Additionally, Ming-Cheng added dummy variables for type of 
aircraft.  Aircraft types were broken down into three categories: fighter/attack, 
cargo/tanker, and other.  The results of the regression analysis provides a similar 
conclusion to the previously mentioned RAND study that examined O&S cost drivers for 
Air Force aircraft.  Average flying hours, number of aircraft, flyaway costs, and fleet age  
were all significant in predicting whether or not a certain type of aircraft will experience 
O&S cost growth.  The flyaway cost variable is noted as possibly the most significant 
explanatory variable in predicting O&S cost growth (17:49). 
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     O&S Cost Reduction – U.S. Navy. 
 O&S reduction initiatives have been at the forefront for all service branches.  
Significant cost savings were identified for the Navy in its replacement timing of its H-3 
helicopter fleet with the CH-60.  The Sikorsky H-3 helicopter has been in service for an 
average of 34 years (18:2).  The Navy has 54 in its inventory and has projected the first 
replacement CH-60 to occur in the year 2008 (18:2-3).  Even though the H-3 fleet 
recently underwent an overhaul process, maintaining these old aircraft will become 
increasingly expensive (18:2).   
 The H-3 performs the following missions for the Navy:  
• Executive battle staff transportation- the movement of VIPs from ship to ship, 
ship to shore, shore to ship, or shore to shore. 
•  Search and rescue  
• Passenger/Mail/Cargo Services and Air 
• Torpedo/Drone recovery 
• Special warfare support   
The CH-60 will be able to meet all the above mission requirements along with 
additional capability.  The addition of external fuel tanks will allow an endurance 
increase up to six hours (18:10).  Air speed with the CH-60 will be faster, between 150  
and 175 knots compared to 120 knots of the H-3.  It will also have a more modern 
computerized hovering system, allowing it more stability when hovering (18:11).  The 
CH-60 will also be able to carry up to 5,500 pounds of palletized cargo, as well as a 
9,000 pound cargo hook compared to a 6,000 pound hook for the H-3 (18:13-15).  
Finally, the CH-60 will have self protection available, making it equipped to perform 
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many of its duties in more hostile environments if necessary (18:16).  “It will have 
ballistically tolerant fuel systems, flight controls and dynamic components.  It will have 
infrared suppression, wire strike protection, and chaff and flare dispensers (18:15-16).” 
In order to compare the benefits of replacing the H-3 with the CH-60, a 
comparison of historical costs was performed.  From 1986 to 1996, the Navy operated 
seven models of the H-3 helicopter (18:21).  One of the models, the SH-3H, was used for 
anti-submarine warfare and not combat support mission, so data for this version was not 
included in the calculation of O&S costs for the H-3 (18:21).  The data for the total yearly 
O&S cost for the six models came from the Navy’s VAMOSC system.  The total annual 
O&S cost for the H-3 was found by adding the costs for each of the 10 years.  The total 
O&S costs were approximately $1.1 billion (1997 constant dollars) (18:21-22).  The total 
flying hours for each model by year was also available in the VAMOSC database, which 
totaled across the ten year period to 200,580 hours (18:27).  The average O&S cost per 
flight hour was found by dividing the total annual cost by the total flying hours, which 
was $5,324 (1997 constant dollars) (18:28). 
Now that an average cost per flight hour had been determined for the H-3, similar 
calculations had to be performed for the CH-60.  At the time of the comparison, the    
CH-60 had not entered into Navy service, so historical O&S cost data was unavailable 
(18:29).  The Navy VAMOSC system had data available on the HH-60 helicopter, which 
was the closest aircraft in mission and configuration to the CH-60 (18:29).  The HH-60H 
Sea Hawk was determined to be the best surrogate for CH-60 O&S costs (18:31).  Data 
was available for the Sea Hawk from 1990 to 1996 (18:32).  The estimated cost per flight 
hour for the HH-60H was $3,347. (18:38).   
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The estimated savings in O&S costs per year were found by multiplying an average 
utilization rate of 342 hours per helicopter by the number of H-3s in the Navy’s inventory 
by each of the determined cost per flying hour figures previously calculated (18:40-41).  
The total savings achieved by replacing the H-3 now as opposed to much later was $36.5 
million annually (18:45). 
The current plan involved replacing the H-3 starting in 2008 by procuring 6 the first 
year, followed by 18 each year until 42 CH-60s were available to replace 54 H-3s 
(18:42).  The proposed plan involved accelerating the procurement by eight years and 
increasing the first purchases up to 36 aircraft (18:44).  The total O&S savings for the 
period from 2000 to 2010 were found to be $292.1 million (18:45). 
Since the planned replacement of the H-3 with the CH-60 was not a one-to-one 
replacement, base operating and support costs would also be much lower (18:46).  These 
costs are incurred by the facility that supports the squadron that operates the aircraft and 
include such things as lodging, personnel support, and general support (18:46).  Finally, 
“increasing the number of helicopters purchased per year would allow the manufacturer  
to take advantage of economies of scale and spread the fixed costs of the production of 
the aircraft over more units (18:47).”  The procurement cost per unit would be lower, 
compensating the cost of replacing the helicopters sooner (18:47). 
 
     Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter. 
 The management team of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) saw the importance of 
reduced O&S costs in the early concept and development stages of the program.  The 
management team wanted to analyze the benefits to be realized in O&S cost savings by 
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introducing contractor competition during the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) and production phases.  The idea is that such competition will lead 
to better design and production, which would also lead to better reliability during field 
operations.  A frequently referenced example is the great engine war, which pitted 
General Electric’s F-110 engine against Pratt & Whitney’s F-100 engine to induce Pratt 
& Whitney to produce a more reliable version of the F-100 engine (19:65).  DoD relied 
on the fact that this higher reliability will lead to a reduction in O&S costs.  The JSF 
management team decided to examine the extent of possible competition-induced 
reductions in O&S costs to see if such reductions might be large enough to affect their 
estimate of the likelihood of breaking even by introducing a second-source producer 
(19:65). 
The analysis of this O&S costs reduction effort followed a four-step approach: 
1. Elements of O&S costs were identified that were likely to be affected by the 
contractor’s actions during EMD and production in a typical military aircraft 
program.  This was done by reviewing the categories by which O&S costs are 
typically reported and judging which of those would be likely to change as a 
result of changes in system reliability. 
2. The magnitudes of those competition-sensitive O&S costs in the JSF were 
determined, as currently estimated its projected operational life.  The JSF 
Program Office provided this data. 
 
3. The sensitivity of those competition-sensitive O&S costs to changes in reliability 
were calculated.  Those estimates, made by the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) using the JSF O&S cost estimation model, yielded a range of possible 
savings resulting from competition during production, expressed as a percentage 
change in certain JSF O&S costs. 
 
4. The Savings were used to adjust previously reported break-even calculations to 
determine whether the projected O&S cost savings led to a significant change in 
the overall likelihood of breaking even (19:65-66). 
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In step 1, it was concluded that contractors have the highest level of potential 
influence over O&S costs in five areas: unit-level consumable supplies, depot-level 
repairables, airframe overhauls, engine overhauls, and support equipment repair (19:66).  
In step 2 engine overhauls was excluded because competition for engine EMD and 
production is already planned.  Percentages of O&S costs were determined for 
consumables, Depot-level repairable, and overhauls.  It was determined in steps 3 and 4 
that competition-induced improvements in system reliability are likely to yield O&S 
dollar savings over the operational life of the JSF fleet, however, the reductions that 
would be realized would not be large enough to overcome the cost penalties of 
introducing competition (19:72). 
 
     Air Force Flying Hour Program- Historical Problems. 
The Air Force has had problems accurately forecasting flying hour program 
estimates, mainly due to the confusion over how to define flying hour consumable 
supplies.  “Up until FY92, when wing financial analysts used the term ‘flying hour 
program’, they were referring to consumable supplies used to maintain their wing’s 
aircraft (20:1).”  The term ‘flying hour program’ was redefined and included many more 
elements when funding for Depot Level Reparables (DLRs) and Aviation Petroleum, Oil, 
and Lubricants (AVPOL) was decentralized to the wing level (20:1).   
For years, the financial community had worked diligently on the task of clearly 
defining and properly measuring the flying hour consumable supplies program (20:1).  
With the decentralization of DLRs and AVPOL, the work was left unfinished and a more 
clear-cut definition was not made available (20:1). 
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Since 1980, financial analysts had significant problems with the planning, 
programming, and budgeting for flying hour consumable supplies (20:2).  Since there 
was no Air Force-wide definition of consumables, each major command (MAJCOM) 
distributed funding, tracked expenditures, and performed analysis based on its own 
definition (20:2).  Another issue that arose involved the different philosophies among the 
MAJCOMs (20:2).  “While one command might consider flying hour related costs to 
include any costs directly or indirectly related to maintaining the aircraft, another might 
use a stricter definition and only include costs directly related to maintaining the aircraft 
(20:2).”   
With funding decentralization and growth of the flying hour program, wing and 
MAJCOM levels had a more critical task of justifying funding requirements and also 
spending reduction with funding already in place (20:2-3).  The different consumable 
supply definitions used by the MAJCOMs and inconsistencies between, as well as within 
commands, on what is considered a flying hour expense made this task difficult for the 
wing and MAJCOMs (20:3).   
At the time, consumable supplies shared the same accounting codes with non-
flying mission items.  A financial analyst had to manually separate the flying mission 
items from non-flying items, a very time-consuming task prone to error (20:8).  If 
consumables had their own unique accounting code, retrieving the needed information 
specifically for flying-mission items would be much simpler and allow the analyst to 
construct a true picture of flying hour expenditures (20:8).  Due to cost reduction efforts 
DoD wide, more accurate information is critical for leaders to make informed decisions 
(20:8).   
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A formal definition of what qualifies as flying hour consumables must be 
developed and distributed (20:9).  “This definition should not be based on where an item 
is purchased, but what an item is and how it relates to the flying mission (20:9).”  The 
definition should include a formalized list of criteria, with examples to aid personnel in 
determining whether an item should be classified as flying hour-related (20:9).   
 
     Cost Per Flying Hour Calculation. 
 In a thesis entitled Flight Hour Costing at the Type Commander and Navy Staff 
Levels: An Analytical Assessment, Edwards examines the Flying Hour Program (FHP) 
and assesses the models used at the operational level, the community sponsor level, and 
the budgeting level (21:6).  The Navy FHP “is the primary vehicle through which the 
Service maintains a readily available force of combat and support aircraft, aircrews, and 
ground support personnel” (21:7).  Edwards concentrates his research on the Pacific Fleet 
(COMNAVAIRPAC).  One goal of the thesis was to “provide guidelines for budget 
control to more accurately predict variances as well as the average flight hour costs by 
aircraft type” (21:3-4).  Edwards claims that FHP estimates are not correct during budget 
formulation because FHP funds are capped by Congress (21:2).  The calculation for FHP 
funding is calculated by multiplying required flight hours to sustain a planned proficiency 
by the CPFH of each specific T/M/S of aircraft (21:1-2).  The thesis explores alternate 
methods of predicting FHP costs in the search for a better way of estimating future costs. 
 Edwards asserts that inaccurate estimates for the FHP adversely affect mission 
readiness.  The research provides Type Commanders and Naval Air Station comptrollers 
with the current factors that affect FHP calculations so that true FHP predictions reflect 
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all of the crucial factors involved in forecasting FHP projections.  Edwards describes the 
procedures involved in the budget submission process for the FHP.  The calculation for 
the annual budgeted cost for active duty units is as follows: 
• (Primary Authorized Aircraft per sqdn) x (Crew Seat Ratio) = Allowed Crews per 
Squadron (21:17). 
• (Allowed Crews) x (Aircrew Manning Factors) = Budgeted Crews per Squadron 
(21:18). 
• (Budgeted Crews) x (Req. Hrs/Crew/Month) x (12 mos.) = Annual Flying Hours 
Required per Sqdn (21:18). 
• (Ann. Flying Hrs Req. per Sqdn) x (Number of Sqdns) = Total Annual Flying 
Hours Required (21:18). 
• (Total Ann. Flying Hrs Req.) x (Primary Mission Readiness percentage) = Annual 
Budgeted Flying Hours (21:18). 
• (Ann. Budgeted Flying Hours) x (CPFH) = Annual Budgeted Cost, Active Duty 
forces (converted to “then-year” dollars) (21:18). 
 Each individual unit submits requirements through the chain of command during 
the budget cycle.  The units are compiled and later combined with the other services 
inputs.  Reviews are conducted until OSD and the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) agree on the funding items.  Eventually, the submission for the FHP becomes part 
of the Federal Budget submission to Congress.  
 Edwards describes the relationship between the players involved in submitting the 
flight hour costing information as well as the CPFH determination.  The office of the 
Special Assistant for the Flying Hour Program (N889E) collects flight information 
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compiled into a database dating back to 1982.  The Type Commanders submit data in 
Flight Hour Cost Reports (FHCR) that separate the information into actual obligations 
taken from each T/M/S by total number and cost pool (21:42).  The database is updated 
monthly.  To make budgeted CPFH projections, the Navy Comptroller’s Office calculates 
a three-year running average of the actuals presented by the Type Commanders on their 
FHCR’s (21:42).  After a three-year average is determined, the appropriate escalator 
factors for inflation are applied and a projection is forecasted.  Any unforeseen event 
which may cause an extraordinary increase or decrease in actual funding is normalized to 
smooth the data for future forecasting. 
 One of the problems with CPFH determination deals with the consistency with 
matters of “conflicting data, computations, and priorities which should be addressed” 
(21:43).  Organizations use different databases, formulas, and priorities when calculating 
CPFH numbers.  Type Commanders must get their figures in line with the community 
sponsor or persuade the FHP office to change the way computations are made (21:45). 
Variances of ten arise between what is planned and what actually occurs.  A negative 
CPFH variance is often viewed as damaging to the organization.  At the unit level, the 
Type Commanders have developed factors influencing CPFH calculations.  Some of the 
major factors include: 
• Unit Location- “The operating environment of a squadron can have a significant 
effect on flying expenses” (21:46). 
• Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) - Funding is approved on a yearly basis.  The 
operational tempo may vary extremely from year to year depending on the flow of 
operations (21:47). 
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• Type of Flying- “Whereas the Training and Readiness Matrices provide guidance 
as to the number of flight hours each event requires, it does not specify the 
intensity of the evolution” (21:48). 
• Non-PMA and Support Flights- A portion of the missions flown do not count 
towards aircrew readiness.  These miscellaneous flight hours must be flown by 
the units (21:48). 
• Aircraft Maintenance Costs and Human Error- The cost of aircraft 
maintenance and repair is a core constituent in the CPFH equation.  The collection 
and reporting of maintenance requests and data submissions is a tedious process.  
Human error is likely to occur at some point in the process (21:49-50). 
 
     Army Flying Hour Program Methodology – Historical Problems. 
 The Army’s flying hour program has been criticized in the past due to poor 
performance.  From fiscal years 1984 to 1988, the Army underflew its flying hour 
program by 35.6 percent, compared to an overflight by the Navy of 2.3 percent and 
underflight by the Air Force of 3.7 percent (22:3).  Even though the Army has an aircraft 
fleet larger than the Navy, and as large as the Air Force, it did not have the headquarters 
personnel in place to effectively manage its flying hour program (22:3).  The Navy and 
Air Force had at least six individuals committed to the program, while the Army 
dedicated only one (22:4).   
 The Army improved its execution rate in its flying hour program from 87.4 
percent in fiscal year 1986 to 98.2 percent in fiscal year 1988 (22:4).  Despite this 
positive trend, then Executive Secretary to the Defense Resources Board (Programming 
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Phase) David Chu directed the Army to submit a report to the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense no later than 1 May 1989, outlining plans for improving the management and 
oversight of the Aviation Flying Hour Program (22:4).  There was still serious doubt in 
the DoD whether the Army’s procedures were strong enough to effectively plan and 
execute the flying hour program (22:4).   
 The under execution of the flying hour program can be traced to the different 
methodologies used to predict flying hour requirements for the different commands.  The 
methods used by unit, major command (MACOM), and Department of the Army levels 
were all different, leading to inaccurate and inflated requirements.  The inflated 
requirements were difficult, sometimes impossible, for the Army units to attain.  This 
inability lead to the program being underflown.   
At the unit level, the methodology was people and event based (22:16).  A unit 
commander considered the number of aircrew personnel and aircraft assigned, mission 
support requirements, hours necessary for maintenance, and the status of aviation and 
supported unit training (22:12).  Training requirements were broken out to include: 
qualification training, refresher training, mission training and initial as well as refresher 
night vision goggle training (22:13).  The hours required for each type of training were 
multiplied by the number of personnel to come up with a total hourly requirement.  
Simulator time was deducted from this total to come up with a net total hourly 
requirement for training (22:13).  The second part of a unit’s flying hour program 
included unique mission support and operational requirements, such as: combat and 
combat support; executive and staff transport; aerial photography and mapping; research, 
development, test, and evaluation; aeromedical evacuation; and special missions unique 
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to location and operation (22:13-14).  The commander also estimated how much training 
could be accomplished collectively, as well as the hours required for maintenance 
activities (22:14-15).  A model detailing the flying hour requirements for each helicopter 
in a unit was completed and forwarded to the MACOM responsible for funding allocation 
of the flying hour program.  It should be pointed out again that the unit level 
methodology was people and event based in order to properly compare it to the 
methodology of the Department of the Army, which will be explained later.   
The MACOM aviation officer relies on military judgment, expertise, and 
historical data to identify any deviations from what would be considered normal for a 
particular unit (22:19).  The MACOM simply totaled requirements for all subordinate 
units and forwarded the data for all aircraft systems to the Department of the Army 
Headquarters for funding (22:19-20).   
The Department of the Army based predictions for the flying hour requirements 
on the assumption that for every airframe there is one and only one crew available to fly 
the aircraft (22:23).  The Department of the Army level was airframe based while the 
subordinate units, or actual users of the flying hours, was based on crews available and 
annual personnel turnover rates (22:23).  Typically, aviation units are undermanned, 
leading to an overstatement of requirements with the airframe based methodology 
(22:23).   
As much as possible, Army headquarters rolled up all the MACOM requests for 
flying hour funding into the Army’s POM.  Since there were still concerns about the 
accuracy of the requests, the Army staff responsible for the flying hour program 
recomputed the data using an Air OPTEMPO rate (22:25).  This rate was an indicator that 
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expressed flying hour requirements, resourcing levels, and execution in terms of flight 
per-crew per-month for rotary wing aircraft (22:25).  This rate was applied to the active 
component’s six combat commands (22:25).  For example, the Air OPTEMPO rate for 
fiscal year 89 was 15.0 hours (22:25).  For a unit with 21 aircraft assigned, the number of 
hours required for the year would be found by multiplying 15 hours by 21 aircraft by 12 
months to arrive an annual requirement (22:25).  Since the airframe based methodology 
assumes one aircrew per airframe, this lead to a requirement overstatement (22:26).  
After applying this procedure across the entire service, Army headquarters was seeking 
more hours than the individual units could fly (22:26).  This situation gave the impression 
that the Army was either very inefficient in executing its flying hour program or very 
inaccurate at predicting requirements (22:26). 
 
Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, we document the implications of O&S costs on the total life-cycle 
cost of weapon systems and how these costs are increasing from year to year.  The O&S 
regulations and instructions provided by the DoD are explained to show what the services 
are required to estimate and track in order to reduce the O&S costs associated with major 
acquisition programs, as well as systems currently in inventory.  Along with the 
establishment of the VAMOSC system for each service, these efforts were intended to 
allow more accurate estimates of O&S costs and better budgeting.  From the perspective 
of the Air Force and Navy, the efforts to develop predictive models for O&S costs have 
had mixed results.  Due to the size and complexity of O&S costs, it was determined that 
forecasting a small segment of these costs, the CPFH program, would be a better 
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approach.  Some of the historical problems with the CPFH calculations for all services 
were detailed in this chapter to show differences that lead to inaccurate estimates.  From 
these studies, we will develop a simple forecasting model that can be used quickly and, 
most importantly, is easily explained. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter provides an in-depth view of the methodology that will be applied in 
conducting the research of O&S costs for Army rotary winged aircraft. This chapter 
begins with a brief description of the OSMIS database and explains how data was 
collected for this study.  The chapter then focuses on the details of the empirical breakout 
of the total CPFH expenditures by MACOM for each helicopter type, which consists of 
consumable and depot-level reparable parts and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL).  
The next step is to compare the actual expenditure CPFH to the budget submissions of 
each MACOM for each helicopter being studied.  Then the actual CPFH expenditures are 
analyzed, exploring different forecasting options to determine which option best fits each 
series of data.  After the best forecasting option is selected, the forecasted figures are 
analyzed by comparing them with the actual expenditures.  The results of this comparison 
will then be analyzed by comparing them to the results of the actual expenditures 
compared to the budget submissions.  The final step in this methodology is to apply the 
chosen forecasting method in developing a forecast for FY04 for each helicopter by 
MACOM. 
 
Database 
 As mentioned in Chapter I, the OSMIS database will be used to gather the 
necessary data for the analysis and forecasting for this research.  The database includes 
all major Army weapon systems.  OSMIS was developed to satisfy Congressional O&S 
reporting requirements and contains unclassified operating costs associated with a 
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weapons system.  The information contained in OSMIS is a collection of data from 
various sources.  It contains actual flying hours from the Unit Level Logistic System- 
Aircraft/Ground (ULLS-A/G), parts information from the Continuing Balance System 
Expanded (CBS-X), and parts pricing from the Army Master Data File (AMDF).    
 The necessary CPFH data for analysis and forecasting is accessed through three 
separate queries options:  (1) Class IX data captures all consumables and depot-level 
reparable parts (DLRs); (2) JP8 fuel consumption, which is the main fuel for the Army; 
and (3) lubricant oil.  The components of the two separate queries for fuel make up the 
total costs for the POL portion of the CPFH for the aircraft.  Upon selecting Class IX 
Single Stock Fund from the list of options, the User is taken to a search page that allows 
one to tailor the information to specific needs.  From here, drop down menus allow one to 
select the fiscal year (FY) of the data requested and the type of helicopter.  Parts cost is 
calculated based on pricing from the Army Master Data File (AMDF), a database that 
contains all parts currently in the Army's inventory.  Currently, pricing for parts in 
OSMIS only includes years 2001 quarter 1 to 2002 quarter 4.  The default pricing for 
2002 quarter 2 will be used throughout the data retrieval process. 
Table 10.  FY95 AH-64A Apache Parts Costs for FORCOM 
MDS MDS Name MACOM 
Name
FY QTR CONS REPS TOTAL Density Activity
AH-64A APACHE FORSCOM 1995 1 $7,711,893 $18,132,718 $25,844,612 262 9,654
AH-64A APACHE FORSCOM 1995 2 $7,250,761 $15,225,885 $22,476,646 247 7,980
AH-64A APACHE FORSCOM 1995 3 $7,029,692 $15,437,743 $22,467,435 247 6,562
AH-64A APACHE FORSCOM 1995 4 $5,719,573 $13,899,942 $19,619,515 274 9,187
 
When the parts data is retrieved, consumables and DLR parts are separated to allow 
further analysis on individual pieces of the CPFH, if necessary.  The activity level, or 
actual hours flown, for a particular fiscal year is also obtained from this same query.  
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Table 10 is an example of a parts query for the Apache.  For fuel consumption, JP8 and 
oil are obtained in two separate queries for each FY by helicopter.  Tables 11 and 12 are 
examples of these retrievals. 
Table 11.  FY95 AH-64A Apache JP8 Costs for FORSCOM (Then Years) 
MDS MDSNAME FY QTR MACOM 
NAME
FUEL
TYPE
FUEL NOMENCLATURE ACTIVITY 
HOURS
TOTAL
AH-64A APACHE 1995 1 FORSCOM JP8 TURBINE FUEL, KEROSINE 9,654 $808,523
AH-64A APACHE 1995 2 FORSCOM JP8 TURBINE FUEL, KEROSINE 7,980 $668,325
AH-64A APACHE 1995 3 FORSCOM JP8 TURBINE FUEL, KEROSINE 6,562 $549,568
AH-64A APACHE 1995 4 FORSCOM JP8 TURBINE FUEL, KEROSINE 9,187 $769,411
 
Table 12.   FY95 AH-64A Apache Oil Costs for FORSCOM (Then Years) 
MDS MDSNAME FY QTR MACOM 
NAME
FUEL
TYPE
FUEL NOMENCLATURE ACTIVITY 
HOURS
TOTAL
AH-64A APACHE 1995 1 FORSCOM OIL LUBOIL ATE MIL-L-7808 1 QT CN 9,654 $1,931
AH-64A APACHE 1995 2 FORSCOM OIL LUBOIL ATE MIL-L-7808 1 QT CN 7,980 $1,596
AH-64A APACHE 1995 3 FORSCOM OIL LUBOIL ATE MIL-L-7808 1 QT CN 6,562 $1,312
AH-64A APACHE 1995 4 FORSCOM OIL LUBOIL ATE MIL-L-7808 1 QT CN 9,187 $1,837
 
The data for parts and flying hours was extracted from OSMIS for FY93-FY02 
for each of the three helicopters.  Fuel data only covers FY95-FY02.  All data will be 
placed into a consolidated table in order to calculate a historical CPFH to be used in a 
forecasting model.  The individual pieces will be maintained to allow individual analysis, 
if necessary.  Since parts costs are provided in 2002 dollars, they will be converted to 
Then Year similar to the fuel data, which is in Then Year dollars upon retrieval.  The 
conversion will be based on the factors for Then Year to Base Year/Constant Year for Air 
Force appropriation 3400, O&M funds, provided in the SAF/FMC inflation conversion 
tables.  Table 13 is an example of the consolidated information for the AH-64A for 
FORSCOM. 
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Table 13.  Calculated CPFH, AH-64A - FY95 - 02 
Hours Actual
FY Consumables DLRs POL Flown CPFH
1995 $25,572,442 $57,855,869 $2,714,372 33,383 $2,580
1996 $20,359,261 $50,836,519 $2,848,314 31,662 $2,339
1997 $15,059,526 $46,920,165 $3,049,272 31,803 $2,045
1998 $14,295,582 $43,911,050 $2,842,753 29,792 $2,049
1999 $16,295,243 $46,000,357 $2,848,656 28,991 $2,247
2000 $12,716,551 $43,532,546 $1,744,354 24,813 $2,337
2001 $14,227,517 $36,156,838 $1,593,330 16,592 $3,133
2002 $14,004,176 $63,571,277 $2,324,120 19,241 $4,153
 
 
Empirical CPFH Breakout 
 The three different pieces of the flying hour program total cost will be used for 
the empirical breakout.  Each helicopter will be evaluated for FY00-02 in total showing 
total expenditure by MACOM for the flying hour program.  Pie charts will be created 
showing the percentage that each MACOM contributes to the entire cost for that FY.  
Table 14 and Figure 15 is an example of this breakout for the AH-64A for FY00.  The 
top three MACOMs in terms of total expense for a given fiscal year will be used for the 
cost category breakout.  Table 3-6 and Figure 16 is an example of this breakout.  The 
percentage that each of the three categories contribute to total cost should provide a 
means to compare the costs from year to year without the outside influence of inflation, 
because increases due to inflation will apply to all of the categories.  For each helicopter 
the total percentage breakout for each FY will be compared to one another to analyze any 
trends that might be present. 
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Table 14.  Total CPFH Expenditure, AH-64A - FY00 
2000 USAR USAREUR FORSCOM ARNG EUSA TRADOC
Consumables $1,029,118 $14,519,971 $12,716,551 $9,434,765 $5,359,617 $5,477,922
DLRs $5,297,704 $42,353,173 $43,532,546 $25,946,384 $12,198,989 $16,109,898
POL $380,815 $1,338,512 $1,744,354 $879,242 $883,109 $1,264,767
Tot Expense $6,707,637 $58,211,656 $57,993,451 $36,260,391 $18,441,715 $22,852,588
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Figure 15.  Total CPFH Expenditure, AH-64A - FY00 
Table 15.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, AH-64A - FY00 
2000 USAREUR FORSCOM TRADOC Total
Consumables $14,519,971 $12,716,551 $5,477,922 $32,714,444
DLRs $42,353,173 $43,532,546 $16,109,898 $101,995,617
POL $380,815 $1,744,354 $1,264,767 $3,389,936
Tot Expense $57,253,959 $57,993,451 $22,852,588 $138,099,997
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Figure 16.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, AH-64A - FY00 
 
Actual Cost per Flying Hour Versus Budget Submissions 
 The Army budgets the CPFH by MACOM.  In this section, the budget 
submissions of the CPFH of the helicopters for FY00-FY02 will be evaluated for selected 
MACOMs by comparing them to the actual CPFH calculated from the OSMIS database.  
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A percent of error will be calculated for each comparison to be made by using the 
following formula:  
actual budgeted−
actual
100⋅
   (1) 
Using the percent of error will also place emphasis on the fact of being over or under the 
budgeted CPFH.  These errors will be summarized and then readdressed later when the 
forecasted CPFH is calculated and compared to the actual CPFH using the same formula.   
 
Forecasting Options 
 For each MACOM being analyzed, three different forecasting techniques will be 
used to evaluate the CPFH data extracted from the OSMIS database.  The three 
forecasting techniques being employed will be a 3-year moving average (MA3), the 
single exponential smoothing (SES) method, and the Holt's Linear Method.  The MA3 
uses the average of the past three observations to forecast for the current period.  The 
number of data points in each average remains constant and includes the most recent 
observations (24:142).  The formula for an MA3 calculation is: 
Ft 1+
1
3
t 2−
t
i
Yi∑
=
⋅
   (2) 
Where Ft+1 is the current forecast, Yi is the ith observation, and t is the sequence order 
number of the observation before the current forecast.  This method was selected for use 
in this research mainly due to its simplicity; it is very easy to use and explain.  The reason 
the order of the MA is three and not higher, such as five, is due to the fact that the data 
series is so small.  Although a higher order would result in a better, smoother forecast, it 
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would greatly restrict the number of figures forecasted.  The main problem with this 
forecasting technique is that it does not handle trends very well and can take several 
periods before the forecast can catch up to a level shift in the data (24:146). 
 
The SES method uses the following formula to forecast for the next period: 
Ft 1+ Ft α Yt Ft−( )+   (3) 
Where, Ft is the most recent forecast, Ft+1 is the current forecast, Yt is the most recent 
observation, and alpha is a weight value between 0 and 1.  The new forecast is essentially 
the previous forecast plus an adjustment for the error of the previous forecast.  The level 
of alpha dictates how much the previous forecast error is weighted.  The weight of the 
previous error increases as alpha increases and becomes closer to 1.  The Solver function 
within Excel will be used to find the optimal value for alpha for each SES forecast.  
Initialization of all of the SES forecasts will be done by using the first observed value as 
the first forecast, so that F1 = Y1, and then proceeding from that point using the equation 
for SES.  This forecasting technique was also selected for its simplicity of use and 
understanding.  This method is good because as each new forecast uses the error of the 
previous forecast, it ends up using a weighted scheme that uses decreasing weights as the 
observations get older (24:147).  The downfall of this forecasting method is the same as 
the MA3 in that it doesn’t handle trends very well and will trail any trend in the actual 
data (24:148). 
 The Holt’s linear method uses the following three formulas to forecast for the 
next period: 
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Lt α Yt 1 α−( ) Lt 1− bt 1−+( )+   (4) 
bt β Lt Lt 1−−( ) 1 β−( )bt 1−+      (5) 
Ft m+ Lt bt m+        (6) 
Where Lt is an estimate of the level of the series at time t and bt is an estimate of the slope 
of the series at time t, alpha and beta are smoothing constraints between 0 and 1, Yt is the 
most recent observation, Lt-1 is the last smoothed value, bt-1 is the trend of the previous 
period, and m is the number of periods ahead to be forecasted (24:158).  This method of 
forecasting was selected because unlike the previous two methods, Holt’s can handle 
trends within the data (24:158).  This method is also useful because it can forecast more 
than one period ahead, if needed.  One of the drawbacks of this method is that it can take 
the forecast a long time to overcome the influence of a shift in the opposite direction of 
the overall trend of the data (24:161).  The main disadvantage method is the complexity 
involved in both using this method and explaining it to management that might not have a 
background in forecasting. 
 Four evaluation measures will be utilized for every forecast calculated.  They are: 
the Mean Error (ME), the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), the Mean Percent Error (MPE), 
and the Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE).  The ME is simply the average of all of 
the error terms and uses the following formula: 
ME
1
n
1
n
t
et∑
=
⋅
   (7) 
Where et is the error (observation – forecast), and n is the number of observations. 
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However, the ME is likely to be small since positive and negative errors tend to offset 
one another (24:43).  The MAE compensates for this bias by first taking the absolute 
value of each error term and then taking the average.  The formula for MAE is: 
MAE
1
n
1
n
t
et∑
=
⋅
   (8) 
The MPE is calculated by finding the percent of error for each term and then taking the 
average of those terms.  The formula for MPE is: 
MPE
1
n
1
n
t
PEt∑
=
⋅
   (9) 
Where PEt is percentage error [(actual-forecast)/actual]*100.  As with the ME, the MPE 
allows terms to offset one another.  The MAPE compensates for the bias of MPE by 
taking the absolute value of each percent of error and then taking the average.  The 
formula for MAPE is: 
MAPE
1
n
1
n
t
PEt∑
=
⋅
  (10) 
These four summary statistics will measure the goodness of fit of the model to the 
historical data (24:45).  All four statistics will be evaluated as a whole because all of 
these measures together can tell a more complete story of goodness of fit than any 
individual summary statistic.   
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Actual Cost Per Flying Hour Versus The Forecast  
 After the forecast has been evaluated and the method of forecasting has been 
chosen for each time series being studied, the forecasted CPFH for FY00-FY02 will be 
compared to the actual CPFH extracted from the OSMIS database using the following 
percent of error formula: 
actual forecasted−
actual
100⋅
  (11) 
These percent of errors will then be compared to the percent of errors computed when 
evaluating the accuracy of the budgeted CPFH. 
 
Forecasting for FY04 
 The final step of this research is to provide a forecast of the CPFH for FY04.  This 
will be accomplished upon the availability of the FY03 CPFH data within the OSMIS 
database.  The method chosen for each MACOM flying a particular helicopter in the 
Forecasting Options section is utilized to make the FY04 forecast.  The FY03 data points 
are added to each applicable time series and the FY04 CPFH is calculated. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provided a roadmap for conducting the necessary research of this 
thesis.  The methodology was provided in a logical order in which the research will be 
conducted.  The tables provide insight into the OSMIS database and what to expect for 
the empirical CPFH Breakout section of Chapter IV.  The formulas and their descriptions 
provide an in-depth look at the statistics used to evaluate not only the forecast, but also 
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the budget submissions of each MACOM.  Following the steps laid out in this chapter 
will definitely provide answers to the research questions/objectives listed in Chapter I. 
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter details the results of all analysis performed on the data retrieved 
from the Army's OSMIS database.  The chapter begins with the breakout of total 
expenditure for the flying hour program across all MACOMs that utilize each of the 
helicopters being studied: the AH-64A Apache, the CH-47D Chinook, and the UH-60A 
Blackhawk.  The top three MACOMS, with the most expense for the flying hour 
program, was used for further detailed analysis and forecasting purposes.  The next step 
involved a percentage breakout of the three pieces of the flying hour program across the 
top three MACOMs previously selected.  A historical CPFH for the top three MACOMs 
was then calculated and compared to the budgeted CPFH that was reported for FY00-
FY02.  Finally, the historical CPFH for each MACOM was used in three different 
forecasting scenarios to determine which one results in an accurate tool to be utilized for 
forecasting a FY 04 CPFH.  The forecasts from the most appropriate model were 
compared to the historical and budgeted CPFH to determine if the results from these 
forecasting methods are valid for comparison to results from current budgeting 
procedures. 
 
AH-64A Apache 
     Total Expenditure Breakout by MACOM. 
The total expenditure breakout involves all MACOMs that utilize the AH-64A.  
Table 16 is a sample of this breakout for the Apache for FY00.  The dollar figures show 
total expense for each command for the three CPFH components. 
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Table 16.  Total CPFH Expenditure, AH-64A - FY00 
2000 USAR USAREUR FORSCOM ARNG EUSA TRADOC
Consumables $1,029,118 $14,519,971 $12,716,551 $9,434,765 $5,359,617 $5,477,922
DLRs $5,297,704 $42,353,173 $43,532,546 $25,946,384 $12,198,989 $16,109,898
POL $380,815 $1,338,512 $1,744,354 $879,242 $883,109 $1,264,767
Tot Expense $6,707,637 $58,211,656 $57,993,451 $36,260,391 $18,441,715 $22,852,588
 
In order to determine the top three MACOMs in terms of expense, a percentage 
chart provides a graphic example.  Figure 17 shows all the MACOMS relevant for 
analysis.  All MACOMS that did not report flying hours for the fiscal year, or made up 1 
percent or less of the total expense across all MACOMs, were excluded from the 
breakout.  Also, only active duty MACOMs were considered as part of the top three, 
ruling out all expenditures reported by the ARNG and USAR commands.  These 
commands were included in the analysis if they met the percentage threshold and flying 
hour requirements but were not used for further analysis. 
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Figure 17.  Total Expenditure Breakout, AH-64A - FY00 
 
The top three MACOMs for the Apache in FY00 were the USAREUR, 
FORSCOM, and TRADOC commands.  Figures 18 and 19 show the breakouts for FY01 
and FY02.   
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Figure 18.  Total Expenditure Breakout, AH-64A - FY01 
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Figure 19.  Total Expenditure Breakout, AH-64A - FY02 
 
The top three MACOMs for FY01 and FY02 are similar to FY00.  FORSCOM, 
USAREUR, and TRADOC will be the focal point for the remaining analysis and 
forecasting for the AH-64A Apache.  Now that the MACOMS were reduced to the top 
three according to total expenditure, a breakout of the three cost categories was next. 
 
     CPFH Cost Category Breakout - AH-64A. 
The cost category breakout involved the total amount expended on consumables, 
DLRs, and POL across the top three MACOMs selected for the AH-64A.  Table 17 
provides an example of the data consolidated for the AH-64A for FY00.   
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Table 17.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, AH-64A - FY00 
2000 USAREUR FORSCOM TRADOC Total
Consumables $14,519,971 $12,716,551 $5,477,922 $32,714,444
DLRs $42,353,173 $43,532,546 $16,109,898 $101,995,617
POL $380,815 $1,744,354 $1,264,767 $3,389,936
Tot Expense $57,253,959 $57,993,451 $22,852,588 $138,099,997
 
The category breakout provides a percentage that each piece of the flying hour 
program contributes to the entire expense for a given year.  Figure 20 shows the 
percentages for the three cost categories for the AH-64A for FY00. 
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Figure 20.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, AH-64A - FY00 
 
The largest percentage of the total was DLRs at 74 percent, followed by 24 
percent and 2 percent for consumables and POL, respectively.  Figures 21 and 22 show 
the breakouts for FY01 and FY02. 
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Figure 21.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, AH-64A - FY01 
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Figure 22.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, AH-64A - FY02 
 
The breakouts for the three fiscal years show no significant deviation in the 
makeup of the CPFH in the three cost categories.  The amount spent by the three 
MACOMS in total was consistent from FY00-FY02. 
 
     Historical CPFH Calculation - AH-64A. 
In order to forecast future CPFHs for the AH-64A, the historical cost was 
calculated.  For the AH-64A, data was available for all three cost categories from FY95-
FY02.  The parts data was priced at FY02 pricing, and fuel was Then Years.  The parts 
data was converted to Then Years to ensure that a consistent cost figure was used.  The 
three cost categories were added together and divided by the amount of hours flown by 
the helicopter in a given fiscal year.  Table 18 details the CPFH calculation for the AH-
64A for FORSCOM. 
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Table 18.  FORSCOM - Calculated CPFH, AH-64A - FY95-02 
Hours Actual
FY Consumables DLRs POL Flown CPFH
1995 $25,572,442 $57,855,869 $2,714,372 33,383 $2,580
1996 $20,359,261 $50,836,519 $2,848,314 31,662 $2,339
1997 $15,059,526 $46,920,165 $3,049,272 31,803 $2,045
1998 $14,295,582 $43,911,050 $2,842,753 29,792 $2,049
1999 $16,295,243 $46,000,357 $2,848,656 28,991 $2,247
2000 $12,716,551 $43,532,546 $1,744,354 24,813 $2,337
2001 $14,227,517 $36,156,838 $1,593,330 16,592 $3,133
2002 $14,004,176 $63,571,277 $2,324,120 19,241 $4,153
 
Table 19 is a consolidated table for all the MACOMs for which a future CPFH will be 
forecasted. 
Table 19.  AH-64A Historical CPFH 
FY FORSCOM USAREUR TRADOC
1995 $2,580 $2,132 $1,361
1996 $2,339 $3,319 $1,377
1997 $2,045 $3,401 $1,317
1998 $2,049 $2,388 $1,358
1999 $2,247 $4,719 $1,586
2000 $2,337 $3,007 $1,270
2001 $3,133 $2,088 $1,827
2002 $4,153 $4,326 $2,123
 
     AH-64A Budget vs. Actual CPFH. 
Before forecasting techniques were applied to the historical data to determine a 
future CPFH, a comparison was made between the actuals and the budgeted data from the 
same fiscal years.  Table 20 shows the percent difference, or deviation, between the 
actual CPFH and the CPFH that was budgeted for the same fiscal year. 
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Table 20.  AH-64A CPFH Actual vs. Budget Comparison 
FY Type TMS FORSCOM TRADOC USAREUR
2000 Actual AH-64A $2,337 $1,270 $3,007
Budget AH-64A $2,727 $1,652 $3,756
% Deviation -17 -30 -25
2001 Actual AH-64A $3,133 $1,827 $2,088
Budget AH-64A $2,389 $1,966 $2,789
% Deviation 24 -8 -34
2002 Actual AH-64A $4,153 $2,123 $4,326
Budget AH-64A $2,531 $2,819 $3,226
% Deviation 39 -33 25
 
Positive numbers indicate the CPFH was under-budgeted for that fiscal year.  Negative 
numbers indicate an over budget situation.  An under-budget situation arises when the 
actual CPFH expense is higher than what was originally budgeted or estimated.  An over-
budget situation occurs when the actual expense is lower than the budgeted CPFH.  In 
only three out of the nine cases, across all fiscal years and MACOMs, was there an 
under-budget situation: in FY01 for FORSCOM and in FY02 for FORSCOM and 
USAREUR.  For all others, the actual CPFH was lower than the budgeted figure, as much 
as 33 percent for TRADOC in FY02. 
 
     AH-64A Forecasts. 
To start the forecasting process, it was necessary to graph the original data to 
detect any underlying trend.  Figure 23 shows the actual CPFH for all three MACOMs 
under analysis. 
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Figure 23.  AH-64A Historical CPFH, FY95-FY02 
The data shows a steady increasing trend for FORSCOM from FY98 to the 
present, with the trend increasing dramatically from FY00-FY02.  TRADOC shows a 
steady data series, with a gradual trend from FY00-FY02.  The USAREUR data is 
volatile, with extreme spikes in the data in FY00 and FY02.  These graphs give guidance 
as to which of the three forecasting methods should result with the most accurate 
forecast. 
Figure 24 shows the results of the three forecasting techniques applied to the 
CPFH for FORSCOM.  After performing forecasts with all three methods, Holt's resulted 
in a MAPE of 8.3254, the lowest of the three.  SES and MA produced higher MAPEs at 
12.50 and 18.98, respectively.  The graph revealed Holt's method most accurately reflects 
the actual data, tracing it closely from FY95 to FY00 and accounting for the trend 
component in the actual data with the evident increase in FY01 and FY02.  The MAPE 
was minimized with an alpha and beta of one. 
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Figure 24.  FORSCOM Actual CPFH vs Forecasting Methods, AH-64A 
For USAREUR, the data was much more volatile, and selecting a forecasting 
technique was more difficult with the limited amount of data available.  Figure 25 shows 
the results of the three techniques along with the actual CPFH for USAREUR. 
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Figure 25.  USAREUR Actual CPFH vs Forecasting Methods, AH-64A 
The lowest MAPE obtained for USAREUR is 28.38695 with the SES forecasting 
method.  The MAPE was minimized with an alpha of 0.1102.  The MAPE for the Holt's 
method was the highest at 45.35, followed by MA at 32.31.  With the data available, SES 
was the most accurate of the three.  In this case, the choice for the best forecasting 
method came down to the lowest MAPE obtained from each one.  The graph provides no 
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visual confirmation because no method accurately reflects the actual figures.  SES and 
MA, which do not account for trend, show no trend component in their forecasts.  The 
Holt's method, which does account for trend, cannot correct quickly enough due to the 
extremes in the real data so it appears to lag behind the actuals.  There is no consistent 
trend in the actual data for Holt's to reflect accurately.  With a MAPE so high, a naïve 
method could be just as accurate, which would simply use the previous year's CPFH as 
the forecast for the next year.  The graph does not provide any guidance to the best 
method because none of the forecasts reflect the actual data with any accuracy. 
Finally, for TRADOC, Figure 26 shows the actual CPFH with the results of the 
three forecasting techniques.  Although Holt's and SES both obtain very close MAPEs at 
11.702 and 12.21, respectively, the Holt's forecast is closer in line with the actual data 
according to the graph.  The increasing trend in the actual data is being mirrored by the 
Holt's forecast.  MA, with the highest MAPE at 15.330, and SES show a close similarity 
when compared to the actual data and do not appear to be tracking the trend successfully.  
The MAPE in the Holt's forecast was minimized at an alpha of 0.3359 and a beta of 1. 
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Figure 26.  TRADOC Actual CPFH vs Forecasting Methods, AH-64A 
In summary, for the AH-64A Apache, the most accurate forecasting tool for 
FORSCOM was the Holt's method.  SES would result in the best forecast for USAREUR, 
although the extreme changes in the data available makes even this method not very 
reliable.  Finally, the most accurate forecasting method for TRADOC command would be 
the Holt's method.  Now that a forecasting method had been selected, a comparison was 
made between the actual, budgeted, and forecasted CPFH for FY00-FY02. 
 
     AH-64A CPFH Actual and Budgeted vs Forecast. 
Although some of the forecasting methods produced very high MAPEs, a 
comparison to budgeted CPFH can reveal how the forecasting methods performed by 
comparing them to the results of an established procedure used historically every year for 
budget submissions.  Table 21 shows a summary of the actual CPFH versus the budgeted, 
as well as forecasted CPFH, for FY00-FY02 for the three MACOMs under analysis.   
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Table 21.  AH-64A CPFH Actual vs. Budget & Forecast Comparison 
FY Type FORSCOM TRADOC USAREUR
2000
Actual vs. Budget -17% -30% -25%
Forecast -5% -18% 12%
2001
Actual vs. Budget 24% -8% -34%
Forecast 23% 23% -29%
2002
Actual vs. Budget 39% -33% 25%
Forecast 5% 21% 39%
 
Positive numbers indicate an under-budget situation as well as a situation in 
which the forecast under estimated the actual CPFH.  Negative numbers indicate an over 
budget situation and situation in which the forecast over estimated the actual CPFH.  For 
FORSCOM, the Holt's forecasting method produced results that deviated from the actual 
CPFH less than the budgeted figure.  Although some cases show a deviation as high as 23 
percent for FORSCOM, as in FY01, the budgeted number shows a deviation of 24 
percent. 
For TRADOC in FY01 and USAREUR in FY02, the forecasting method 
performed with less accuracy when compared to the actual CPFH.  The forecast deviated 
more than the budgeted from the actual CPFH in only two out of nine occasions.  Now 
that the AH-64A Apache had been studied, the CH-47D Chinook was analyzed and a 
forecast developed. 
Ch-47D Chinook 
     Total Expenditure Breakout by MACOM. 
As with the AH-64A, the total expenditure breakout for the flying hour program 
involved all MACOMs that utilize the CH-47D.  Table 22 is an example of the breakout 
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for the Chinook for FY00.  The dollar figures show total expense for each command for 
the three CPFH components. 
Table 22.  Total CPFH Expenditure, CH-47D - FY00 
2000 USASOC USAREUR FORSCOM ARNG USARPAC EUSA TRADOC
Consumables $2,516,457 $2,177,475 $5,574,719 $5,615,214 $2,640,769 $3,878,485 $3,371,634
DLRs $2,818,060 $8,130,967 $25,588,245 $15,321,124 $7,332,355 $22,357,087 $7,185,693
POL $1,596,698 $1,617,150 $6,660,097 $11,935,063 $3,546,189 $2,780,943 $2,928,716
Tot Expense $6,931,214 $11,925,592 $37,823,060 $32,871,402 $13,519,312 $29,016,515 $13,486,043
 
The total expenditure breakout included FY00-FY02.  The top three MACOMs 
with respect to total cost was used for further analysis and forecasting.  Figure 27 shows 
the percentage breakout by MACOM. 
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Figure 27.  Total Expenditure Breakout, CH-47D - FY00 
All MACOMs that did not report flying hours for a particular fiscal year, or made 
up 1 percent or less of the total expense across all the MACOMs, were excluded from 
further analysis.  Additionally, only active duty MACOMs were considered candidates 
for the top three, excluding all expenditures reported by ARNG and USAR commands.  
These commands were included in the analysis if they met the flying hour requirement 
and percentage threshold but were not used for further analysis.  Figures 28 and 29 show 
the remaining breakouts for FY01 and FY02. 
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Figure 28.  Total Expenditure Breakout, CH-47D - FY01 
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Figure 29.  Total Expenditure Breakout, CH-47D - FY02 
The top three MACOMs for FY00-FY02, excluding ARNG, are FORSCOM, 
EUSA, and TRADOC commands.  These three commands were the focal point for the 
remaining analysis and forecasting for the CH-47D Chinook.  Now that the MACOMs 
were reduced to the top three according to total expenditure, a breakout of the three cost 
categories was next. 
     CPFH Cost Category Breakout - CH-47D. 
The cost category breakout involves the total amount expended on consumables, 
DLRs, and POL across the top three MACOMs selected for the CH-47D.  Table 23 
provides the data for Chinook for FY00. 
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Table 23.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, CH-47D - FY00 
2000 FORSCOM EUSA TRADOC Total
Consumables $5,574,719 $3,878,485 $3,371,634 $12,824,838
DLRs $25,588,245 $22,357,087 $7,185,693 $55,131,025
POL $6,660,097 $2,780,943 $2,928,716 $12,369,756
Tot Expense $37,823,060 $29,016,515 $13,486,043 $80,325,619
 
The category breakout provides a percentage of what each piece of the flying hour 
program contributes to total expense for a given fiscal year.  Figure 30 shows the 
percentages for the three pieces across the three MACOMs in FY00. 
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Figure 30.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, CH-47D - FY00 
The largest percentage of the total is DLRs, similar to the Apache, followed by 
consumables and POL.  Figures 31 and 32 show the breakout for FY01 and FY02. 
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Figure 31.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, CH-47D - FY01 
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Figure 32.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, CH-47D - FY02 
POL comprises more of the total cost for the Chinook than the Apache.  There 
was a considerable increase in the percentage for consumables from FY00 to FY01, but 
the percentages were consistent with minimal deviation from FY01 to FY02.  Now that 
total costs, as well as the three categories, had been examined, a historical CPFH was 
calculated for each MACOM to be used for forecasting. 
 
     Historical CPFH Calculation - CH-47D. 
In order to forecast a CPFH for the Chinook, the historical cost must be 
calculated.  The historical cost was determined for each fiscal year by dividing the total 
expense across the three cost categories by the total hours flown by the helicopter.  For 
the CH-47D, complete parts and POL data was available from FY95 through FY02.  The 
parts data was priced at FY02 pricing and POL data was in Then Year dollars.  The parts 
data was converted to Then Year dollars to ensure a consistent cost figure was used.  
Table 24 is an example of the CPFH calculation for the CH-47D for FORSCOM. 
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Table 24.  FORSCOM - Calculated CPFH, CH-47D - FY95-02 
Hours Actual
FY Consumables DLRs POL Flown CPFH
1995 $6,880,886 $14,856,239 $4,309,816 17,386 $1,498
1996 $6,923,130 $14,842,546 $3,514,279 13,225 $1,912
1997 $7,299,052 $18,741,388 $3,893,005 13,746 $2,178
1998 $4,943,111 $16,082,752 $3,217,539 11,417 $2,123
1999 $5,760,551 $24,084,744 $3,616,805 12,461 $2,685
2000 $5,574,719 $25,588,245 $6,660,097 14,197 $2,664
2001 $7,684,808 $17,211,180 $4,095,094 14,429 $2,009
2002 $12,717,828 $21,377,755 $5,462,787 15,182 $2,606
 
Table 25 is a consolidated table for all the MACOMs for which a future CPFH will be 
forecasted. 
Table 25.  CH-47D Historical CPFH 
FY FORSCOM EUSA TRADOC
1995 $1,498 $1,246 $1,364
1996 $1,912 $1,683 $1,696
1997 $2,178 $2,927 $1,279
1998 $2,123 $2,253 $1,447
1999 $2,685 $2,558 $1,874
2000 $2,664 $4,895 $2,160
2001 $2,009 $2,188 $3,479
2002 $2,606 $3,948 $3,722
 
     CH-47D Budget vs. Actual CPFH. 
Before the three forecasting techniques were applied to the historical data, a 
comparison was made between the actuals and the budgeted data from the same fiscal 
years.  As with the AH-64A, the comparison was made for the Chinook for FY00-FY02.  
Table 26 shows the percent difference, or deviation, between the actual CPFH and the 
one that was budgeted for the same fiscal year. 
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Table 26.  CH-47D CPFH Budget vs. Actual Comparison 
FY Type TMS FORSCOM EUSA TRADOC
2000 Actual CH-47D $2,664 $4,895 $2,160
Budget CH-47D $1,709 $1,889 $1,470
% Deviation 36 61 32
2001 Actual CH-47D $2,009 $2,188 $3,479
Budget CH-47D $1,869 $2,378 $1,617
% Deviation 7 -9 54
2002 Actual CH-47D $2,606 $3,948 $3,722
Budget CH-47D $2,336 $3,015 $1,959
% Deviation 10 24 47
 
The positive deviations indicate the CPFH was under-budgeted compared to the actual 
expense.  Negative deviations reveal an over-budget scenario.  In all but one instance, 
EUSA in FY01, the CPFH was under-budgeted for the Chinook during FY00-FY02.  The 
deviation was at its highest in FY00 for EUSA, at 61 percent  Now that a historical cost 
was calculated, a forecast could be calculated for the Chinook using the three techniques 
previously discussed. 
 
     CH-47D Forecasts. 
To start the forecasting process for the Chinook, it was necessary to graph the 
historical CPFH that was calculated for the top three MACOMs.  This graph will help 
detect any trend that exists and also aid in the determination of which forecasting method 
will produce the best results.  Figure 33 shows the historical CPFH for FORSCOM, 
EUSA, and TRADOC for the CH-47D. 
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Figure 33.  CH-47D Historical CPFH, FY95-FY02 
The data reveals a steady series for TRADOC for FY95-FY98, with an increasing 
trend from FY98 to FY02.  The trend is pronounced for FY00-FY02.  For FORSCOM, 
there was a mild increasing and decreasing trend in the data series.  EUSA had the most 
volatile data, with sharp increases and decreases in FY00-FY02.   
Figure 34 shows the results of the three forecasting methods applied to the CPFH 
data for FORSCOM, along with the actual CPFH.  The lowest MAPE resulted from the 
Holt's method at 13.00.  Both MA and SES resulted in similar MAPEs at 15.52 and 
15.91, respectively.  With the MAPE and graph together, it was determined that the 
Holt's method would result in the most accurate forecast for FORSCOM.  Once again, 
due to the trend in the data, the Holt's forecast traces the actual data better than either the 
SES or MA method.  Both the MA and SES method lag behind the data series.  MA is 
flat with no trend.  The MAPE was minimized with an alpha of 0.314 and beta of 1. 
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Figure 34.  FORSCOM Actual CPFH vs Forecasting Methods, CH-47D 
As with USAREUR and the Apache, the EUSA data for the Chinook is volatile, 
with significant differences in FY00-FY02.  Due to the limited amount of data points, the 
lowest MAPE was the only reliable measuring tool to determine which method would be 
the most accurate.  By looking at the graph for EUSA's actual CPFH compared to the 
forecasting methods, it was clear that none of the three performed accurately with the 
data series.  Figure 35 shows the results of the three methods. 
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Figure 35.  EUSA Actual CPFH vs Forecasting Methods, CH-47D 
The best choice in this case would be the method with the lowest MAPE, which was 
Holt's at 24.85.  In some cases, the lowest MAPE is not necessarily the best choice.  The 
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MAPE, along with the graphed data, should be used together to make the choice.  In 
EUSA's forecast, it was once again the choice of the lowest MAPE.  None of the 
forecasts account for the extreme points in the data.  Holt's traced a straight upward trend.  
SES and MA also produced an upward trend but much lower, and also under or over 
estimated at the end of the data series.  With more data points, the forecast would 
eventually overcome these extremes and start accounting for changes more accurately.  
The MAPE for Holt's was minimized with an alpha of zero and a beta of 0.4992.  With a 
MAPE so high, a naïve method would be just as appropriate.  The MA and SES methods 
produced MAPEs of  27.54 and 33.60, respectively. 
Finally, for TRADOC, the three methods were applied to the actual data and the 
results are pictured in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36.  TRADOC Actual CPFH vs Forecasting Methods, CH-47D 
The graph shows that both SES and Holt's are very close in relation to the real data, with 
Holt's closer and accounting for the increasing trend more accurately.   The MAPEs for 
the two methods are 20.60 for SES and 15.29 for Holt's.  MA actually resulted in a lower 
MAPE than SES at 16.03, but the graph shows that the other two methods were better at 
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tracing the real data series.  They are both accounting for the upward trend in the data, 
with Holt's closer to the actual.  For TRADOC, the Holt's method was selected and the 
MAPE minimized with an alpha of one and a beta of 0.0640577. 
In summary, for all three MACOMs, the Holt's method was determined to be the 
best forecasting method to predict future CPFH for the CH-47D.  Now that a forecasting 
method was selected for each MACOM, a comparison was made between the actual, 
budgeted, and forecasted CPFH for FY00-FY02. 
 
     CH-47D CPFH Actual and Budgeted vs Forecast. 
The forecasting methods selected for the CH-47D, in some cases, produced very 
high MAPEs.  A similar situation occurred with the AH-64A.  By comparing the 
forecasts to both the actual and budgeted CPFH, the performance of the methods chosen 
could be measured against a procedure used to formulate budget submissions every year.  
Table 27 shows this comparison for each MACOM for FY00-FY02. 
Table 27.  CH-47D CPFH Actual vs. Budget & Forecast Comparison 
FY Type FORSCOM EUSA TRADOC
2000
Actual vs. Budget 36% 61% 32%
Forecast -8% 30% 0%
2001
Actual vs. Budget 7% -9% 54%
Forecast -47% -77% 30%
2002
Actual vs. Budget 10% 24% 47%
Forecast 4% -9% -3%
 
Positive numbers indicate an under-budget situation as well as a situation in which the 
forecast under estimated the actual CPFH.  Negative numbers indicate an over budget 
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situation and situation in which the forecast over estimated the actual CPFH.  For FY00 
and FY02, the selected forecasting method performed better when compared to the 
budgeted CPFH.  In some cases, the forecast deviated as much as 30 percent, such as 
EUSA in FY00, but the budget deviated by 61 percent.  Even though both are off, the 
forecast performed with greater accuracy.  FY01 forecasts show extreme deviations from 
the actual.  With the limited number of data points available, sharp increases or decreases 
cause the forecasts to deviate by a significant margin.  Overall, the forecasting methods 
selected can be used to predict future CPFH for the selected MACOMs with accuracy.  
Now that the CH-47D Chinook had been studied, the final helicopter, the UH-60A 
Blackhawk was analyzed and a forecast developed. 
 
UH-60A Blackhawk 
     Total Expenditure Breakout by MACOM. 
Similar to the AH-64A and CH-47D, the total expenditure breakout involves all 
MACOMs that utilized the UH-60A Blackhawk.  The total includes the three pieces of 
the CPFH program as reported by the different MACOMs in the OSMIS database.  Table 
28 is a breakout for the Blackhawk for FY00. 
Table 28.  Total CPFH Expenditure, UH-60A - FY00 
2000 USAREUR FORSCOM ARNG USARPAC EUSA TRADOC
Consumables $7,324,507 $6,457,348 $10,698,399 $2,445,043 $3,370,392 $3,919,074
DLRs $26,840,790 $29,379,092 $32,956,091 $7,298,237 $19,457,618 $11,529,102
POL $2,975,610 $4,576,816 $12,362,940 $2,173,302 $3,448,164 $3,268,797
Total Expense $37,140,907 $40,413,255 $56,017,430 $11,916,583 $26,276,174 $18,716,973
 
The top three MACOMs according to this total expense breakout were again used 
from this point forward in the remaining analysis and forecasting.  A percentage chart for 
the UH-60A for FY00 provides a graphic example of this breakout, indicated by Figure 
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37.  The same criteria were applied as before when selecting the top three MACOMs.  All 
MACOMs that did not report flying hours for the fiscal year, or those that made up 1 
percent or less of the total expense across all MACOMs, were excluded.  Additionally, 
only active duty MACOMs were considered for part of the top three, excluding ARNG 
and USAR commands.  These commands were included in the analysis if they met the 
percentage threshold and flying hour requirements but were not considered from any 
point beyond that. 
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Figure 37.  Total Expenditure Breakout, UH-60A - FY00 
In FY00, the top three MACOMs in terms of total expense were FORSCOM, 
USAREUR, and EUSA.  Figures 38 and 39 show the breakouts for FY01 and FY02. 
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Figure 38.  Total Expenditure Breakout, UH-60A - FY01 
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Figure 39.  Total Expenditure Breakout, UH-60A - FY02 
For FY01 and FY02, the top three MACOMS were FORSCOM, USAREUR, and 
TRADOC.  Since TRADOC was present in two out of the last three years, I chose it as 
the third MACOM.  FORSCOM, USAREUR, and TRADOC were used for the remaining 
analysis and forecasting.  Now that the top three MACOMs were determined, a breakout 
of the three cost categories was accomplished. 
 
     CPFH Cost Category Breakout - UH-60A. 
The cost category breakout included the total amount expended by the top three 
MACOMs selected for the UH-60A on consumables, DLRs, and POL.  Table 29 provides 
the expenses for FY00 for the UH-60A. 
Table 29.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, UH-60A - FY00 
2000 USAREUR FORSCOM TRADOC Total
Consumables $7,324,507 $6,457,348 $3,974,863 $17,756,718
DLRs $26,840,790 $29,379,092 $19,029,253 $75,249,134
POL $1,884,723 $2,770,268 $2,190,063 $6,845,054
Total Expense $36,050,019 $38,606,708 $25,194,179 $99,850,906
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The cost category breakout provides a percentage that each piece of the flying 
hour program contributes to the total expense for the top three MACOMs in a given fiscal 
year.  Figure 40 shows this breakout for the UH-60A for FY00. 
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Figure 40.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, UH-60A - FY00 
As with the AH-64A and CH-47D, DLRs makes up the largest percentage at 75 
percent, followed by consumables at 18 percent and POL at 7 percent.  Figures 41 and 42 
show the breakouts for FY01 and FY02. 
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Figure 41.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, UH-60A - FY01 
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Figure 42.  CPFH Cost Category Breakout, UH-60A - FY02 
The percentages show no significant deviations in the CPFH spending makeup 
from year to year.  The percentages of the three categories were fairly consistent across 
the three MACOMs for FY00 through FY02. 
 
     Historical CPFH Calculation - UH-60A. 
Similar to the AH-64A and the CH-47D, a historical CPFH was calculated for the 
UH-60A to be used in all three forecasting scenarios.  It also allowed the comparison 
between the actual and budgeted CPFH to see how budgeting procedures have performed 
over the last three fiscal years.  The historical cost was determined for each fiscal year by 
dividing the total expense across the three cost categories by the total hours flown by the 
helicopter.  For the UH-60A, complete parts and POL data was available from FY95 
through FY02.  The parts data was priced at FY02 pricing and POL data was in Then 
Years.  The parts data was converted to Then Year dollars to ensure a consistent cost 
figure was used.  Table 30 is an example of the CPFH calculation for the UH-60A for 
FORSCOM. 
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Table 30.  FORSCOM - Calculated CPFH, UH-60A - FY95-02 
Hours Actual
FY Consumables DLRs POL Flown CPFH
1995 $7,239,902 $27,835,793 $2,459,651 29,861 $1,257
1996 $6,882,839 $29,422,699 $2,417,441 27,390 $1,414
1997 $7,883,874 $25,996,631 $2,738,942 29,116 $1,258
1998 $8,201,915 $33,561,465 $3,027,730 32,351 $1,385
1999 $8,736,882 $36,064,543 $2,836,768 29,424 $1,619
2000 $6,457,348 $29,379,092 $2,770,268 29,301 $1,318
2001 $9,536,092 $30,210,048 $2,277,837 24,186 $1,738
2002 $11,900,362 $47,747,686 $2,770,268 23,453 $2,661
 
Table 31 is a consolidated table that shows the historical CPFH for the top three 
MACOMs for the UH-60A Blackhawk.  The actual CPFH figures was used for the three 
forecasting scenarios. 
Table 31.  UH-60A Historical CPFH 
FY FORSCOM USAREUR TRADOC
1995 $1,257 $1,794 $853
1996 $1,414 $2,145 $829
1997 $1,258 $1,650 $783
1998 $1,385 $2,176 $627
1999 $1,619 $2,171 $893
2000 $1,318 $1,892 $843
2001 $1,738 $1,345 $1,277
2002 $2,661 $3,202 $1,359
 
     UH-60A Budget vs. Actual CPFH. 
Before the different forecasts were performed, a comparison was made between 
the actual and budgeted CPFH.  Table 32 shows the percent difference, or deviation, 
between the calculated historical CPFH and the budgeted CPFH.  Positive numbers 
indicate the CPFH was under-budgeted for that fiscal year.  Negative numbers indicate an 
over budget situation.  An under-budget situation arises when the actual CPFH expense is 
higher than what was originally budgeted or estimated.  An over-budget situation occurs 
when the actual expense is lower than the budgeted CPFH.   
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Table 32.  UH-60A CPFH Budget vs. Actual Comparison 
FY Type TMS FORSCOM USAREUR TRADOC
2000 Actual UH-60A $1,318 $1,892 $843
Budget UH-60A $1,446 $2,151 $851
% Deviation -10 -14 -1
2001 Actual UH-60A $1,738 $1,345 $1,277
Budget UH-60A $1,377 $1,859 $768
% Deviation 21 -38 40
2002 Actual UH-60A $2,661 $3,202 $1,359
Budget UH-60A $1,461 $1,785 $1,018
% Deviation 45 44 25
 
All three MACOMs show an over-budget situation for FY00.  For FY01 and FY02, there 
was only one occasion where a MACOM was over-budget, USAEUR in FY01.  For all 
other situations, the actual CPFH was far above and beyond the budgeted figure.  The 
highest deviation was found in FY02 for FORSCOM at 45 percent over budget. 
 
     UH-60A Forecasts. 
To begin forecasting for the UH-60A, the first step was the same as for the AH-
64A and the CH-47D, a graph of the original data.  This graph helped detect any 
underlying trend that may be present.  Figure 43 shows a plot of the historical CPFH for 
all three MACOMs being studied for the UH-60A. 
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Figure 43.  UH-60A Historical CPFH, FY95-FY02 
FORSCOM shows mild increases and decreases from FY95 through FY00, with a 
sharp increase in FY01 and an even greater jump in FY02.  TRADOC shows a mild 
decreasing trend until FY98, with a sharp increase in FY01 and FY02.  Finally, 
USAREUR shows a trend for the UH-60A similar to USAREUR for the AH-64A and 
CH-47D.  The data is volatile, especially from FY00 through FY02, with an increase in 
CPFH of over $2,000 per hour.  The trends that have been pointed out should be handled 
better with the SES or Holt's method of forecasting. 
Figure 44 shows the results of the three forecasting methods used with the 
FORSCOM data, along with the actual CPFH.  The Holt's forecast most closely 
resembles the real data and also had the lowest MAPE at 14.994.  SES and MA result in 
very similar plots in relation to the actual data, with MAPEs of 15.94 and 17.65, 
respectively.  With the graph, the Holt's method was the chosen method because it 
accounts for the upward trend in the data more so than SES or MA, which are fairly flat.  
The MAPE was minimized with an alpha of 0.5471 and a beta of zero. 
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Figure 44.  FORSCOM Actual CPFH vs Forecasting Methods, UH-60A 
Figure 45 shows the plot of the three forecasts along with the actual data for 
USAREUR.  The data has extreme values, especially for FY00 through FY02.  This 
situation makes it difficult to choose the best method with the limited amount of data 
available, which was similar for USAREUR with the AH-64A.  The lowest MAPE 
results from the SES method.  From the graph, it was difficult to say which method 
presents the best representative for the actual data.  SES and MA are flat and do not 
account for the highs and lows of the data, while Holt's does not show to recover from the 
extremes until the very end of the series.  With more data points, Holt's could correct for 
the data's extremes.  The MAPE was the final indicator.  Since SES produces the lowest 
one with USAREUR's data, it was chosen as the best method for forecasting.  The MAPE 
is minimized at an alpha of 0.082278. 
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Figure 45.  USAREUR Actual CPFH vs Forecasting Methods, UH-60A 
Finally, Figure 46 shows the three forecasts with the actual CPFH for TRADOC.  
The Holt's forecast was more like the actual data according to the graph and resulted in 
the lowest MAPE at 13.10.  The MAPE gets worse with SES and MA at 15.50 and 24.15, 
respectively.  For TRADOC, the most accurate forecasting method would be the Holt's 
method.  The MAPE was minimized at an alpha of 0.6381 and a beta of 0.82776. 
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Figure 46.  TRADOC Actual CPFH vs Forecasting Methods, UH-60A 
In summary, the Holt's method is appropriate for FORSCOM and TRADOC's 
data, while SES is the method to use for USAREUR.  Now that the forecasting method 
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for TRADOC had been selected, a comparison was made between the forecasts, actuals, 
and budgeted CPFH for FY00-FY02. 
 
     UH-60A CPFH Actual and Budgeted vs. Forecasts. 
Table 33 shows the comparison between the three different CPFHs.  A positive 
number indicates an under-budget and forecast percent deviation.  A negative number 
shows an over-budget and forecast percent deviation.  Even though budget as well as 
forecasts deviated from the actuals in all cases, in only two cases did the budgeted figure 
perform better than the forecast: FORSCOM in FY00 and USAREUR in FY01.  For the 
data available, the forecasting methods would be a useful tool in predicting future CPFHs 
for the UH-60A.   
Table 33.  UH-60A CPFH Actual vs. Budget & Forecast Comparison 
FY Type FORSCOM USAREUR TRADOC
2000
Actual vs. Budget -10% -14% -1%
Forecast -35% 1% 0%
2001
Actual vs. Budget 21% -38% 40%
Forecast 3% -39% 29%
2002
Actual vs. Budget 45% 44% 25%
Forecast 30% 43% -3%  
 
FY 2004 CPFH Forecasts. 
In order to calculate the most accurate forecast possible for FY04, FY03 actual 
data is needed for the three pieces of the CPFH for each helicopter.  Currently, this data is 
unavailable from the OSMIS database.  It is projected to be available 1 March 2004.  For 
the methods selected for each MACOM, a FY04 forecast can still be calculated but with 
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less reliability.  For the Holt’s method, a forecast can be developed with the latest data 
available, FY02, for as many steps ahead as necessary.  For the SES method, the FY04 
forecast is simply the same forecast for FY03.  Due to the limitation of available data, 
this is the best forecast for FY04 that can be calculated at this time.  Table 34 shows the 
FY04 forecast for the AH-64A for the three MACOMs under analysis. 
Table 34.  AH-64A FY04 Forecast 
AH-64A Method FY04 Forecast MAPE
FORSCOM Holt's $6,192 8.33
USAREUR SES $2,807 28.39
TRADOC Holt's $2,391 11.70  
For FORSCOM and TRADOC, the Holt’s method produces a two-steps ahead 
forecast based on the formula described in chapter III, where m=2.  For USAREUR, the 
FY04 forecast is the same forecast for FY03.  The MAPEs are the same for the models 
when the FY03 forecast was calculated. 
For the CH-47D and UH-60A, the same method was used to forecast the CPFH 
for FY04 due to the limited data availability.  Tables 34 and 35 list the methods, forecast, 
and resulting MAPEs for these helicopters. 
Table 35.  CH-47D FY04 Forecast 
CH-47D Method FY04 Forecast MAPE
FORSCOM Holt's $2,274 13.00
EUSA Holt's $5,181 24.85
TRADOC Holt's $4,412 15.30  
Table 36.  UH-60A FY04 Forecast 
UH-60A Method FY04 Forecast MAPE
FORSCOM Holt's $2,616 14.99
USAREUR SES $1,939 20.33
TRADOC Holt's $1,848 13.10  
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Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the top three MACOMs in terms of total expense were used to 
compare the budgets prepared for their flying hour program and the actual expenditures 
for the AH-64A Apache, CH-47D Chinook, and the UH-60A Blackhawk.  Three 
different forecasting methods were used to determine which one best forecasts the CPFH 
for FY03.  Based on the MAPEs and a graph of the forecasts with the actual data, it was 
determined that, for FORSCOM and TRADOC, the Holt's method was the most 
appropriate for all the data series for the three helicopters.  For USAREUR, the data for 
the AH-64A Apache and UH-60A Blackhawk included extreme values that made it 
difficult to say with accuracy which method would produce the best forecast.  The lowest 
MAPE was used to determine that, with the data available, the SES method was the most 
appropriate for these data sets.  The situation was the same with EUSA and the CH-47D 
Chinook.  Extreme values, and a limited amount of data points, make the lowest MAPE 
the most reliable indicator for the best forecasting method.  SES was chosen for the    
CH-47D and the EUSA MACOM.  Even though the MAPEs for these forecasts were 
high, the budgeted figures deviated from the actual CPFH on seven occasions compared 
to only two for the forecasts of the same FY. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
 
Problem Revisited 
 Operations and Support costs constitute the majority of the total life cycle cost for 
Air Force weapons systems.  The first step in being able to control these costs is to 
understand the elements that comprise these costs and the proportion each element 
contributes to the total cost.  The understanding of the nature of these costs will lead to 
more accurate budget submissions and better fiscal responsibility.  The discrepancy 
between budget submissions and actual expenditures for CPFH programs lends itself to 
the need for the research conducted within this thesis.  The primary objective of this 
research was to provide OSD/CAIG with a useful tool to forecast CPFH for Army rotary 
aircraft.  These forecasts would then be used by the OSD/CAIG to analyze both the 
budget submissions of the Army and the independent cost estimates of the OSD/CAIG. 
 
Limitations 
 Even though a useful a tool was developed in this research, it does need routine 
maintenance and call for additional analysis as new data is added.  The forecasts that 
were developed for each MACOM cannot simply be extended as the next fiscal year’s 
data becomes available.  In order to be consistent with the methodology used and 
described in Chapter III, the applicable alpha and beta levels of each forecast must be 
recalculated as data is added to each time series.  After these parameters are recalculated, 
all three forecasting methods can be extended one period and then reevaluated using the 
four-evaluation measure also described in Chapter III.  Also, as new data becomes 
available it will be necessary to evaluate the time series to ensure that all of the data 
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being used is still relevant when forecasting for the next period.  It is possible that a 
change in CPFH reporting procedures could produce a cost level shift that could cause 
prior years data to become irrelevant when trying to predict the future costs. 
 
Summary of Literature Review 
 The literature review starts by explaining how O&S costs have become an 
important issue within the DoD and then describes the initiatives of the DoD to control 
these costs.  The rest of the literature review is broken down into two major categories: 
Major O&S Guidance, and Past Research.  The Major O&S Guidance section gives an 
overview of Title 10 that establishes the legal requirement for O&S cost estimating and 
reporting.  This section also provides an overview of the DoD directives and guidance 
that tailor the O&S cost estimating and reporting to the specific needs of the DoD.  This 
section continues by explaining the establishment of both the VAMOSC and OSMIS 
systems, and then ends with a brief summary of the three helicopters being studied.  The 
Past Research section includes the details and results of four other theses and four 
professional reports that directly relate to the material of this research.  This section 
contains studies of CPFH and O&S cost reduction from the Army, Navy, and the Air 
Force.  Although none of the literature of this section is an exact match of the research of 
this thesis, it does provide a solid background and show the necessity of the research 
contained within this thesis. 
 
Review of the Methodology 
 The methodology of this research starts with a description of the OSMIS database 
and the necessary steps to extract the data from it for the empirical CPFH breakout 
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portion of the research.  The methodology also describes the formulas used to evaluate 
the actual CPFH against the budget submissions for FY00-FY02, and the actual CPFH 
against the forecasted figures for FY00-FY02.  The methodology thoroughly describes 
each of the three forecasting methods being employed within this research and provides 
in-depth detail of the four evaluation measures being utilized to determine the overall 
best forecasting method for each time series.  The methodology concludes with an 
explanation of forecasting for FY04, which is the final step of the research conducted. 
 
Restatement of Results 
 The analysis performed for the AH-64A Apache included FORSCOM, 
USAREUR, and TRADOC commands.  For all MACOMs, the CPFH cost category 
breakout was consistent from year to year, with DLRs being the biggest percentage of the 
total.  The Holt's Linear method provided the lowest MAPE and best indicator of the 
actual data for FORSCOM and TRADOC, with the MAPEs being 8.3254 and 11.702, 
respectively.  The best forecast for USAREUR produced a very high MAPE at 28.387 
with the SES method due to extremes in the data points near the end of the series.  The 
actual CPFH went from approximately $3,000 per hour in FY00 down to approximately 
$2,000 per hour in FY01, and then more than doubled to approximately $4,300 for FY02.  
The graph provided little help due to all forecasts not tracing the series very well.  In this 
case, a lack of data points and the volatility of the data indicate that a naïve method could 
possibly be just as good as the three methods.  After comparing the actual, budgeted, and 
forecasted CPFH for FY00-FY02, it was shown that the forecast deviated from the actual 
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CPFH less than the budgeted figure in all but two of the nine cases for the AH-64A, 
TRADOC in FY01 and USAREUR in FY02. 
The analysis for the CH-47D helicopter included FORSCOM, EUSA, and 
TRADOC.  The empirical CPFH breakout showed that POL made up a larger portion of 
the total expense for the Chinook than for the Apache.  DLRs are again the largest 
percent of the total, with little deviation across the three MACOMs, especially FY01-
FY02.  The Holt's method provided the best forecast for all three MACOMs.  For 
FORSCOM and TRADOC, the MAPE was at its lowest with Holt's at 13.00 and 15.29, 
respectively.  A graph of the actual data and forecasts show that Holt's traces the data 
series the closest.  For EUSA, the situation is similar to USAREUR for the Apache.  The 
data series is so volatile that the best method can only be found by using the lowest 
MAPE, which is Holt's at 24.85.  The CPFH goes from approximately $4,900 per hour in 
FY00, down to less than half that for FY01, and almost doubles again in FY02.  The 
graph does not provide a good indicator.  Once again, a naïve method may be just as 
appropriate.  When comparing the actual, budgeted, and forecasted CPFH, it was 
revealed that the forecasts deviated from the actual less that the budgeted CPFH for all 
MACOMs in FY00 and FY02, as well as TRADOC in FY01.  For FORSCOM and 
EUSA in FY01, the forecast performed poorly, with a deviation from the actual as high 
as 77 percent.  The high deviation for these two MACOMs can be explained by the 
volatility of the data series. 
Finally, the UH-60A Blackhawk was analyzed for FORSCOM, USAREUR, and 
TRADOC .  The empirical CPFH breakout revealed no drastic changes from FY00 - 
FY02.  For FORSCOM and TRADOC, the Holt's method produced the lowest MAPEs at 
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14.994 and 13.10, respectively.  The graph of the three forecasts for FORSCOM and 
TRADOC trace the actual data better than the MA or SES method.  For USAREUR, it is 
similar to USAREUR for the Apache, with the data being very volatile, especially from 
FY00 - FY02.  For FY00, the CPFH is approximately $1,350 per hour and more than 
doubles in FY02.  With the limited number of data points, it is difficult to select the most 
accurate forecasting method.  In this case, the MAPE is the only indicator.  SES provides 
the lowest MAPE for the Blackhawk for USAREUR at 20.33.  After comparing the 
actual, budgeted, and forecasted CPFH for the three MACOMs for the UH-60A, it was 
shown that the forecast deviated less from the actuals than the budgeted figure in all but 
two situations, FORSCOM in FY00 and USAREUR in FY01. 
The FY04 forecasts were calculated based on data available through FY02 due to 
FY03 data being unavailable at the time.  Although this technique does not produce as 
accurate a forecast, with limited data available it is the best forecast that can be produced 
at this time. 
 
Recommendations  
 The forecasting methods used in this study are basic models that can be expanded 
or changed to more complex models when more data becomes available.  The methods 
chosen can be easily explained to a decision maker and can yield results quickly and with 
little adjustment.  There is not one overall model that forecasts all the data series with the 
same accuracy.  For now, it is recommended to use the specific models that have been 
identified for each data series.  To restate them: the Holt's method is appropriate for each 
helicopter's data.  For USAREUR and EUSA, SES is the best for the data available.  All 
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three methods can be evaluated when data is added to them, but it is recommended to 
focus on the Holt's method whenever possible because this method accounts for the 
increasing trend that would be evident in the CPFH data series.  The data that currently 
works best with SES will eventually have enough data points that make it more 
conducive to the Holt's method.  Finally, when data is added to the models, the user 
should verify all formulas and run the Solver function again to minimize the MAPE to 
obtain the best forecast possible. 
 
Possible Follow-on Theses 
 The research of this thesis only touches a very small portion of several important 
and interesting topics.  There are many more areas the Army could employ forecasting, 
and the efforts to realize O&S cost savings will be addressed for a long time.  This 
research has shed light on other research opportunities.  Here are some suggestions: 
• Apply this same analysis and forecasting methodology to other Army platforms, 
such as: tanks, land vehicles, and fixed-wing aircraft. 
 
• Apply this same analysis and forecasting methodology to the different pieces of 
the CPFH expense for rotary wing aircraft. 
 
• Analyze the method used to allocate costs within the OSMIS database. 
 
• Repeat this research on the same helicopters as FY04-FY06 data becomes 
available. 
 
• Analyze the CPFH figures forecasted for FY04 to the actual CPFH for FY04 and 
determine reasons for any disconnects that are present. 
 
• Determine useful applications of forecasting techniques in budgeting for other 
Army costs. 
 
• Create a program that will apply the methodology of this thesis to a time series to 
forecast other CPFH factors. 
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• Explore the effects of deployments on total O&S costs. 
 
• Analyze the different methodologies used by each service in determining CPFH 
factors and determine if better methods are available. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114
Bibliography 
 
1. Department of Defense.  Cost Analysis Guidance And Procedures.  DoD Directive 
      5000.4. Washington:  Government Printing Office.  16 Nov 1994. 
 
2. The Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office.  The Effects of Aging 
on the Costs of Operating and Maintaining Military Equipment.  Washington: GPO, 
August 2001. 
 
3. Rumsfeld, Donald H., Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the 
Congress,   Appendix A. 
 
4. Department of the United States Army, United States Army Fact File.  [On-line] 
http://www.army.mil/fact_files_site/aircraft.html 
 
5. Recktenwalt, Thomas J.  “Visibility and Management of Operating and Support 
Costs, System II (VAMOSC II).” Presentation to the Sixteenth Annual Department of 
Defense Cost Analysis Symposium.  October 4-7, 1981. 
 
6. Department of Defense. Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures.  DoD Directive 
5000.4-M. Assistant Secretary of Defense, December 1992 
 
7. United States Congress. Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 144, Section 2434. 
 
8. Department of Defense.  Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide.  DoDR 
5000.4-M. Washington D.C.: May 2002. 
 
9. Department of the Army.  Cost Analysis Manual.  U.S. Army Cost and Economic 
Analysis Center, May 2002.    
 
10. Wiggins, James F. “Defense Acquisitions-Higher Priority Needed For Army 
Operating and Support Cost Reduction Efforts,” FDCH Government Account 
Reports, 29 September 2000. 
 
11. Gavora, William M.  “Prime Vendor Support—the Wave of the Future” Army 
Logistician, 31: 70-71 (January/February 1999). 
 
12. Rose, Pat A. Jr., Captain, USAF.  “Cost Per Flying Hour Factors: A Background and     
Perspective of How They are Developed and What They Do,” The Air Force 
Comptroller, 4-9 (July 1997). 
 
13. United States General Accounting Office.  Defense Budget: Observations on the Air   
Force Flying Hour Program.  Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.  
GAO/NSIAD-99-165.  July 1999. 
 
 115
14. Young, Robert W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Cost and Economics).  
“Cost Factor Process.” Presentation at the OPTEMPO Cost Factor Conference. 
Woodlands Hotel and Conference Center, Williamsburg, Virginia.  21-24 January 
2003. 
 
15. Graves, Timothy J., Joseph S. Domin, and Ronald E. Porten. “Trends in Weapon 
System Operating and Support Cost,” IDA Paper P-3313. October 1997. 
 
16. Donmez, Mustafa, A Parametric Cost Model for Estimating Operating and Support     
Costs of U.S. Navy Aircraft.  MS thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
December 1992 (ADA389448). 
 
17. Wu, Ming-Cheng, Estimating Operating And Support Models for U.S. Air Force 
Aircraft. MS thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2000 (ADA-
376488). 
 
18. Croeber, Hans K. Financial Analysis of Operating and Support Costs for H-3 Aircraft 
Versus CH-60 Aircraft to Complete Helicopter Combat Support Missions. MS Thesis, 
Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, March 1998.  
 
19. Birkler, John and John C. Grasser.  “Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint 
Strike Fighter: Opportunities and Options,”  Rand MR 1362.  November 2001. 
 
20. Limon, Juan F., Captain, USAF.  “Flying Hour Consumable Supplies: More than 
Mere Nuts and Bolts.”  College for Professional Development, Air University, 
Maxwell AFB AL, 1995 (ADA293093). 
 
21. Edwards, Michael V., Flight Hour Costing at the Type Commander and Navy Staff 
Levels: An Analytical Assessment.  MS thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, December 1992 (ADA-261977). 
 
22. Cordrey, Ted D., Lieutenant Colonel, USA.  “The Army Flying Hour Program: Is the 
Methodology Flawed?” U.S Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1989 
(ADA208668).  
 
23. Department of the Navy.  Naval Center for Cost Analysis.  [On-line] 
http://www.ncca.navy.mil/images/aircraftcostcard.gif 
 
24. Makridakis, Spyros, Steven C. Wheelwright, and Rob J. Hyndman. Forecasting: 
Methods and Applications (3rd Edition). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1998. 
 
 
 
 116
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other 
aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
23-03-2004 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis  
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
Jun 2003 – Feb 2004 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING OF ARMY 
OPERATING AND SUPPORT COST FOR ROTARY 
AIRCRAFT  
   
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Hawkins, John C., First Lieutenant, USAF 
 
 
 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
    Air Force Institute of Technology 
    Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/ENV) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 641 
    WPAFB OH 45433-7765 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT/GCA/ENV/04M-03 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
  OSD/PA&E 
     Attn:  Ms. Krystyna M. Kolesar 
     1800 Defense Pentagon 
     Washington DC 20301-1800                        (703) 695-4177 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
REPORT NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
              APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
 
14. ABSTRACT  
 This research explores forecasting techniques to estimate the Cost per Flying Hour for Army Helicopters.  Specifically, three separate forecasting techniques 
are evaluated to better predict the CPFH for better estimating and budgeting by the US Army.  To begin, the three cost categories are empirically analyzed for 
each helicopter.  For forecasting purposes, actual CPFH figures were compiled from 1995 to 2003 for all MACOMs flying the AH-64A, the CH-47D, or the 
UH-60A helicopters.  The number of MACOMs is then reduced to the top three in regards to total CPFH expenditure.  The use of a 3-year moving average, 
single exponential smoothing and Holt’s linear method are explored for each helicopter’s data.  These techniques are used to forecast for FY03 in evaluating 
the best to use for FY04.  By comparing both the budgeted and forecasted figures for FY00 – FY02 to the actual CPFH figures in the same years, an accurate 
CPFH forecast for all of the MACOMs was possible.  When data became available, a comparison of the actual, budgeted, and forecasted CPFH for FY03 was 
performed.  The Holt’s method was discovered to be the best forecasting method for 78 percent of the time series analyzed since they contained positive 
trends, followed by single exponential smoothing.  Finally, the best forecast to be provided for FY04 is calculated with the chosen forecasting method.   
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
      Cost per Flying Hour (CPFH), Forecasting, Rotary Wing Aircraft, Cost, Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Holt’s Linear Method, Single Exponential 
Smoothing (SES), Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC), MH-53J/M, UH-1N, HH-60G 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Michael A. Greiner, Maj, USAF (ENV) 
REPORT 
U 
ABSTRACT 
U 
c. THIS PAGE 
U 
17. LIMITATION OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
UU 
18. NUMBER  
      OF 
      PAGES 
130 19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (937) 255-6565, ext 4588; e-mail:  Michael.Greiner@afit.edu 
Standard Form 298 (Rev: 8-
98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
